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ARTICLES
TAFT, FRANKFURTER, AND THE FIRST
PRESIDENTIAL FOR-CAUSE REMOVAL
Aditya Bamzai *
In the fall of 1912—while one of the most consequential presidential campaigns in United States history raged around them—
William Howard Taft, Felix Frankfurter, and a handful of officials
within the federal government initiated a process to remove two
members of the Board of General Appraisers (“Board”) for inefficiency, neglect of duty, and malfeasance in office. 1 The process culminated in President Taft’s for-cause dismissal of the two members, Thaddeus Sharretts and Roy Chamberlain, on the very last
day that he served as President, after he received a report recommending their firing from a “committee of inquiry” that included
Frankfurter. 2
Taft’s firing of Sharretts and Chamberlain was the first presidential for-cause removal. To this day, it remains the only time in
the history of the nation that the President has expressly removed
for cause an executive branch “officer of the United States” whose
tenure is protected by statute after providing notice to the officer,

* Associate Professor, University of Virginia School of Law. For helpful comments
and encouragement, I owe thanks to Divya Bamzai, Emily Blair, Kate Boudouris, John
Duffy, John Harrison, Tom Nachbar, Caleb Nelson, Sai Prakash, George Rutherglen, and
the editors of the University of Richmond Law Review. All errors are my own. This article
is adapted from a talk given at the University of Richmond Law Review Symposium: Defining the Constitution’s President Through Legal & Political Conflict (Oct. 27, 2017).
1. See JAMES CHACE, 1912: WILSON, ROOSEVELT, TAFT & DEBS—THE ELECTION THAT
CHANGED THE COUNTRY 6, 8 (2004) (describing the presidential election of 1912 as “a defining moment in American history,” which “tackled the central question of America’s exceptional destiny”).
2. See infra Part II.
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holding a hearing, and finding that the statutory predicates for removal have been met. Taft’s action involved decisions by two individuals—Taft himself and Frankfurter—who would go on to become Justices of the United States Supreme Court and to author
two of the most consequential opinions on the President’s authority
to remove subordinates, Myers v. United States 3 and Wiener v.
United States. 4 It involved the construction and application of statutory language—“inefficiency, neglect of duty, or malfeasance in
office”—that Congress still uses to mark some kind of “independence” from presidential control on behalf of an administrative
agency. 5 Echoes of the issues that Taft and Frankfurter confronted
in 1913 may be heard in Myers and Wiener, in Justice Sutherland’s
opinion for the Court in Humphrey’s Executor v. United States, 6
and in recent controversies over the scope of the President’s power
to remove subordinate officers within the executive branch. 7
Despite all of the foregoing, the episode has escaped scholarly
attention and been the subject of no relevant legal discussion. 8 No
account of President Taft’s removal of the two Board members appears in the various treatments of the President’s removal power, 9
or in the large literatures devoted to Taft and Frankfurter, two
3. 272 U.S. 52, 106 (1926).
4. 357 U.S. 349, 351 (1958).
5. See, e.g., 5 U.S.C. § 1211(b) (2012) (providing for removal on grounds of “inefficiency,
neglect of duty, or malfeasance in office” for the Office of Special Counsel); 12 U.S.C. §
5491(c)(3) (2012) (same for Consumer Financial Protection Bureau); 15 U.S.C. § 41 (2012)
(Federal Trade Commission); see also JERRY L. MASHAW ET AL., ADMINISTRATIVE LAW: THE
AMERICAN PUBLIC LAW SYSTEM 257 (7th ed. 2014) (observing that “‘[i]nefficiency, neglect of
duty, or malfeasance in office’ is a common formulation” for statutory provisions limiting
the removal of officers); Marshall J. Breger & Gary J. Edles, Established by Practice: The
Theory and Operation of Independent Federal Agencies, 52 ADMIN. L. REV. 1111, 1144 (2000)
(describing this language as “the prototype removal provision”).
6. 295 U.S. 602 (1935).
7. PHH Corp. v. Consumer Fin. Prot. Bureau, 881 F.3d 75, 77 (D.C. Cir. 2018) (“We
granted en banc review to consider whether the federal statute providing the Director of the
Consumer Financial Protection Bureau (CFPB) with a five-year term in office subject to
removal by the President . . . is consistent with Article II of the Constitution.”).
8. Passing reference to Taft’s firing of Sharretts and Chamberlain may be found in
BRAD SNYDER, THE HOUSE OF TRUTH: A WASHINGTON POLITICAL SALON AND THE
FOUNDATIONS OF AMERICAN LIBERALISM (2017). As Snyder observes, Taft appointed Frankfurter to a three-member committee “to investigate allegations of neglect and customs fraud
against the Board,” id. at 59, and, on the committee’s recommendation, Taft later “fired two
life-tenured members of the Board of Appraisers for cause,” id. at 67.
9. See, e.g., J. DAVID ALVIS ET AL., THE CONTESTED REMOVAL POWER, 1789–2010
(2013); STEVEN G. CALABRESI & CHRISTOPHER S. YOO, THE UNITARY EXECUTIVE:
PRESIDENTIAL POWER FROM WASHINGTON TO BUSH (2008); see also MARSHALL J. BREGER &
GARY J. EDLES, INDEPENDENT AGENCIES IN THE UNITED STATES: LAW, STRUCTURE, AND
POLITICS (2015).
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towering figures in American legal history. 10 Indeed, it is widely,
but mistakenly, assumed that no President has ever removed an
officer for cause and that (in the words of the dissenting opinion in
Free Enterprise Fund v. Public Co. Accounting Oversight Board) “it
appears that no President has ever actually sought to exercise [the
removal] power by testing the scope of a ‘for cause’ provision.” 11 As
a corrective, this article tells the story of Taft’s for-cause removal
of the two general appraisers on his last day in office, following a
process started in the midst of his 1912 reelection battle with future President Woodrow Wilson and former President Theodore
Roosevelt. It then explores the episode’s implications for presentday understandings of the development of the American administrative state and the doctrine of the separation of powers. There
are three reasons to engage in a study of this particular episode.
First, drawing on previously unexplored documents from the papers of Taft and Frankfurter, the narrative touches on one of the
earliest and most central debates of constitutional law—the disputed existence, and disputed scope, of the President’s ability to
fire subordinates within the executive branch. In 1789, the First
Congress engaged in an extensive and sophisticated debate on the
President’s power to control the executive branch by removing subordinates. 12 Over 200 years later, in Free Enterprise Fund, the Supreme Court stressed “the importance of removal as a tool of supervision,” describing it as “perhaps the key means” by which the
President protects the constitutional prerogatives of the executive
branch. 13 Yet notwithstanding the longstanding and central nature of this debate, the contours of the President’s removal power
remain unsettled as both a constitutional and statutory matter. As
a constitutional matter, the precise rule emerging from the Court’s
precedents on this question—two of which, Myers and Wiener, were

10. For works on Frankfurter, see, for example, LIVA BAKER, FELIX FRANKFURTER
(1969); H.N. HIRSCH, THE ENIGMA OF FELIX FRANKFURTER (1981); MICHAEL E. PARRISH,
FELIX FRANKFURTER AND HIS TIMES: THE REFORM YEARS (1982); HELEN S. THOMAS, FELIX
FRANKFURTER: SCHOLAR ON THE BENCH (1960). For works on Taft, see, for example, DONALD
F. ANDERSON, WILLIAM HOWARD TAFT: A CONSERVATIVE’S CONCEPTION OF THE PRESIDENCY
(1973); HERBERT S. DUFFY, TAFT (1930); HENRY F. PRINGLE, THE LIFE AND TIMES OF
WILLIAM HOWARD TAFT: A BIOGRAPHY (1939).
11. 561 U.S. 477, 524–25 (2010) (Breyer, J., dissenting).
12. See Saikrishna Prakash, New Light on the Decision of 1789, 91 CORNELL L. REV.
1021, 1072 (2006).
13. Free Enter. Fund, 561 U.S. at 499, 501; id. at 484 (holding that “multilevel protection from removal . . . contravenes the President’s ‘constitutional obligation to ensure the
faithful execution of the laws’” (quoting Morrison v. Olson, 487 U.S. 654, 693 (1988))).
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written by Taft and Frankfurter—is disputed. As a statutory matter, the meaning of the terms “inefficiency, neglect of duty, or malfeasance in office”—which Congress often uses to restrict the President’s power to remove subordinates—is likewise disputed. 14
The actions of the executive branch—and of President Taft specifically—during the events of 1912 and 1913 can illuminate these
disputed legal questions. In general, separation-of-powers jurisprudence relies on the practices of the political branches to interpret ambiguous legal text. 15 Against the backdrop of this interpretive principle, Taft’s 1913 dismissal of the two general appraisers
is a crucial data point on the scope and meaning of the statutory
terms limiting removal to “inefficiency, neglect of duty, or malfeasance in office.” Indeed, it is a unique data point because, although
it is common for the President to fire executive branch officers who
serve at will, it is rare for the President to remove an officer who
occupies a position subject to statutory tenure protection. Subsequent to Taft’s actions in 1913, only one other President has fired
an executive branch officer “for cause,” albeit without following the
procedures or creating the record that Taft did. 16 As a result, Taft’s
1913 dismissal of Sharretts and Chamberlain provides vital evidence for present-day understandings of the scope of the terms “inefficiency,” “neglect of duty,” and “malfeasance in office.” In this
regard, as explained further below, the committee that Taft appointed produced a report that viewed various forms of self-dealing
and “incompetence” as amounting to “inefficiency,” “neglect of
duty” and “malfeasance in office.” 17
Second, the narrative involves a component of the Department
of the Treasury—the Board of General Appraisers—which was,
14. For a recent discussion of the confusion surrounding these terms, see PHH Corp. v.
Consumer Fin. Prot. Bureau, 881 F.3d 75, 126–27 (D.C. Cir. 2018) (en banc) (Griffith, J.,
concurring); id. at 127 (“In spite of the repeated use of the . . . standard throughout the U.S.
Code and its prominent role in Humphrey’s Executor, the meaning of the standard’s three
grounds for removal remains largely unexamined.”).
15. See, e.g., NLRB v. Noel Canning, 573 U.S. __, __, 134 S. Ct. 2550, 2559 (2014) (stating that, where “the interpretive questions before [the Court] concern the allocation of power
between two elected branches of Government,” “we put significant weight upon historical
practice” (emphasis omitted)); Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579, 610
(1952) (Frankfurter, J., concurring) (“Deeply embedded traditional ways of conducting government cannot supplant the Constitution or legislation, but they give meaning to the words
of a text or supply them.”).
16. That President was Richard Nixon, who in 1969 dismissed Raymond Lapin, the
President of the Federal National Mortgage Association. See BREGER & EDLES, supra note
9, at 155; infra notes 330–34 and accompanying text.
17. See infra Part II.B.
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during an era of high tariffs and no income tax, one of the most
powerful entities within the federal government. Until the ratification of the Sixteenth Amendment to the Constitution in 1913—
which permitted the imposition of direct income taxes—“customs
duties . . . accounted for between 50 and 90 percent of total Federal
income.” 18 As Representative Oscar Underwood put it during a
1908 debate, the general appraisers “passe[d] on all the goods and
the status of the goods that come into the United States from
abroad” and therefore comprised “the most important Board in the
United States, so far as the revenue of the Government was concerned.” 19 Nevertheless, despite the Board’s significance to federal
governance at the time of its creation in 1890 and for many years
thereafter, it now rests in relative obscurity, overshadowed by the
more famous Interstate Commerce Commission created just three
years earlier in 1887. 20
In two significant ways, the Board’s creation and development
provide a window into American institution building at the turn of
the twentieth century. First, like the statute creating the Interstate Commerce Commission in 1887, 21 the statute creating the
Board in 1890 authorized removal for “inefficiency, neglect of duty,
or malfeasance in office.” 22 Second, during the legislative debates
accompanying the creation of the Board, members of Congress disputed the constitutionality of eliminating judicial and jury trial
rights associated with challenging customs determinations—while
lodging review of those determinations in an administrative body,
the Board, housed in the Treasury Department. 23 The establishment and development of the Board thus illustrate the deep connection between the introduction of “good cause” removal restrictions in federal statutory law and the creation of what are
known as “non-Article III” adjudicative bodies within the executive
18. JOHN M. DOBSON, TWO CENTURIES OF TARIFFS: THE BACKGROUND AND EMERGENCE
OF THE U.S. INTERNATIONAL TRADE COMMISSION 1 (1976); see also U.S. CONST. amend. XVI.
19. 42 CONG. REC. 5038 (1908) (statement of Rep. Underwood) (analogizing the Board
to a “justice of the peace court”).
20. MASHAW ET AL., supra note 5, at 5 (“It is common to trace the beginning of modern
U.S. public administration to 1887, a year . . . in which Congress created the Interstate
Commerce Commission . . . .”).
21. Interstate Commerce Act of 1887, ch. 104, § 11, 24 Stat. 379, 383.
22. Customs Administrative Act of 1890, ch. 407, § 12, 26 Stat. 131, 136; see PHH Corp.
v. Consumer Fin. Prot. Bureau, 881 F.3d 75, 121 (D.C. Cir. 2018) (Wilkins, J., concurring)
(“Congress first used ‘inefficiency, neglect of duty, or malfeasance in office’ as a removal
standard for officers of the Interstate Commerce Commission and the General Board of Appraisers in 1887 and 1890, respectively.”).
23. See infra Part I.C.1.
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branch. 24 The rise of restrictions on the President’s removal authority accompanied the shift in adjudication from common-law actions and jury trials to executive branch tribunals like the Board.
The third and final reason: the narrative involves a series of personalities who dominated two generations of American legal
thought. Taft and Frankfurter, the primary actors in the drama of
1912 and 1913, became Supreme Court Justices and wrote Myers
and Wiener. Along the way, the narrative involves Senator George
Sutherland and Representative Joseph McKenna, both of whom
were later appointed to the Supreme Court and one of whom wrote
Humphrey’s Executor. This article is an intellectual history of these
larger-than-life figures before they authored the Supreme Court
opinions that define the scope of the President’s removal power.
Part I of this article lays out the background on the legal question—summarizing the three central cases on the President’s authority to remove subordinates prior to the latter half of the twentieth century, the tariff system in the United States, and the
creation and development of the Board. Part II of this article addresses the events of 1912 and 1913, when President Taft, assisted
by a thirty-year-old Felix Frankfurter, fired two of the members of
the Board. Part III concludes the story with the aftermath of the
events of 1913; assesses the relevance of the episode to our understanding of Myers, Humphrey’s Executor, and Wiener; and provides
some thoughts on the relevance of the episode to current disputes
about the President’s removal power.
I. THE LEGAL AND STATUTORY BACKDROP
Before turning to Taft’s removal of the two members of the Board
in the waning hours of his presidency, it is helpful to study the
legal and statutory framework governing the controversy. This
part does that in three sections. First, Part I.A sets out the legal

24. The Board was therefore an example of a body within the executive branch that
“adjudicates” cases, much like an Article III court, but composed of officers who lacked the
tenure and salary protections Article III confers on judges. RICHARD H. FALLON, JR. ET AL.,
HART & WECHSLER’S THE FEDERAL COURTS AND THE FEDERAL SYSTEM 34, 36 (7th ed. 2015);
see U.S. CONST. art. III, § 1. For cases addressing the authority of executive branch bodies
to make conclusive determinations (or “adjudicate”) disputes that look like Article III “cases”
or “controversies,” see Stern v. Marshall, 564 U.S. 462, 489–90 (2011) (contrasting cases
involving “public rights,” which may be conclusively decided by executive branch entities,
with those that are matters of “private right” and must be resolved in Article III courts);
Crowell v. Benson, 285 U.S. 22, 50–51 (1932).
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framework governing the President’s removal authority over subordinate executive branch officers—a framework that, as explained below, was established in part by two of the main actors in
this article, Taft and Frankfurter. In addition, Part I.A discusses
the present controversy about the meaning of statutory removal
provisions limiting the President’s authority to fire a subordinate
to “inefficiency, neglect of duty, or malfeasance in office.” Second,
Part I.B sets out a brief history of the development of the tariff and
its administration up until the creation of the Board. Third, Part
I.C discusses the formation and development of the Board until the
Taft presidency.
A. The Legal Status of the “Independent” Agencies
The place of “independent” agencies within the three branches
of government is one of the central concerns of scholarship on the
Constitution’s separation of powers. These bodies—considered independent because statutory provisions protect the tenure of
agency heads—span a wide variety of substantive areas. 25 Broadly
speaking, they raise two legal questions: First, are statutory limitations on the President’s authority to remove subordinates constitutional? And second, assuming such statutory provisions are constitutional, precisely how much do they limit the President’s
discretion in removing subordinates?
1. Constitutional Framework
The Constitution does not expressly specify the tenure of or
means of removing subordinate executive branch officers. Article
II vests the “executive Power” in a “President of the United States
of America,” who has the authority to “take Care that the Laws be
faithfully executed” and “nominate, and by and with the Advice
and Consent of the Senate, . . . appoint” officers of the executive
branch. 26 Each house of Congress has the authority to “expel”—or,
one might say, to remove—one of its own members by a two-thirds
vote. 27 Congress also has the authority to remove the President,

25. ROBERT E. CUSHMAN, THE INDEPENDENT REGULATORY COMMISSIONS 3, 760–61
(1941); Kirti Datla & Richard L. Revesz, Deconstructing Independent Agencies (and Executive Agencies), 98 CORNELL L. REV. 769, 771 (2013).
26. U.S. CONST. art. II, §§ 1–3.
27. Id. art. I, § 5, cl. 2 (“Each House may . . . , with the Concurrence of two thirds, expel
a Member.”).
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Vice President, and all other civil officers through impeachment by
the House of Representatives and conviction by the Senate. 28 In
addition, the Constitution does create federal officers with guaranteed “good Behaviour” tenure—namely, the judges who wield the
“judicial Power of the United States” and populate the “one supreme Court” and “inferior Courts [that] the Congress may from
time to time ordain and establish.” 29 Those judges “hold their Offices during good Behaviour” and “receive for their Services, a Compensation, which shall not be diminished during their Continuance
in Office.” 30 By implication, these provisions establish that Article
III judges may be removed only by impeachment in the House and
conviction by the Senate. 31
The First Congress extensively debated (and some argue, settled) the appropriate inferences that could be drawn from these
provisions of the structural Constitution for the question whether
the President has plenary authority, under the Constitution, to remove subordinate executive branch officers. 32 The Supreme Court
did not directly address the constitutional question until the twentieth century, at which point it decided three key precedents that
continue to form the grounds for doctrinal debate in this area of
law. The Board made an appearance in the litigation of each of the
three cases.
In Myers v. United States, the Court—in an opinion by Chief Justice Taft—held that the President had the authority to remove subordinate executive branch officers whom he has appointed by and
with the advice and consent of the Senate. 33 An 1876 statute provided that “[p]ostmasters of the first, second, and third classes
shall be appointed and may be removed by the President by and
with the advice and consent of the Senate, and shall hold their offices for four years unless sooner removed or suspended according
to law.” 34 Myers, a first-class postmaster, was removed before the
end of his term by President Wilson without the Senate’s advice

28. Id. art. I, § 2, cl. 5; id. art. I, § 3, cl. 6; id. art. II, § 4 (“The President, Vice President
and all civil Officers of the United States shall be removed from Office on Impeachment for,
and Conviction of . . . .”).
29. Id. art. III, § 1.
30. Id.
31. See United States ex rel. Toth v. Quarles, 350 U.S. 11, 16 (1955).
32. See Prakash, supra note 12, at 1072.
33. 272 U.S. 52, 106, 134 (1926).
34. Act of July 12, 1876, ch. 179, § 6, 19 Stat. 78, 80.
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and consent. 35 His estate then sued to recover his salary for the
remainder of the term. 36 Chief Justice Taft’s opinion reasoned that
the vesting of the executive power in the President was essentially
a grant of the power to execute the laws, which necessarily included the power to remove subordinate officials. 37
In the course of the opinion, Taft addressed whether Congress’s
creation of “administrative boards” subject to “provisions for the
removal of the members for specified causes” was “inconsistent
with the independent power of removal by the President.” 38 Taft
concluded that the claim was “unfounded” because of the Court’s
1903 decision in Shurtleff v. United States, 39 which held that the
1890 statute authorizing the President to remove members of the
Board for “inefficiency, neglect of duty, or malfeasance in office” did
not prohibit the President from removing an appraiser for other
reasons. 40 Taft understood Shurtleff as “an indication that many of
the statutes” requiring for-cause removal “are to be reconciled to
the unrestricted power of the President to remove.” 41 In dissent,
Justice Brandeis agreed that, under Shurtleff, provisions simply
authorizing removal for “inefficiency, neglect of duty, [or] malfeasance in office” did not restrict “the President’s power to remove for
other than the causes specified.” 42
In Humphrey’s Executor v. United States, the Court distinguished Myers, as well as Shurtleff, and held that Congress could
limit the President’s authority to remove the Commissioners of the
Federal Trade Commission. 43 The statute establishing the Federal
Trade Commission (“FTC”) provided that “[a]ny commissioner may
be removed by the President for inefficiency, neglect of duty, or

35. Myers, 272 U.S. at 106–07.
36. Id. at 106.
37. Id. at 117.
38. Id. at 171.
39. Id. (relying on the Court’s precedent in Shurtleff v. United States, 189 U.S. 311
(1903)).
40. See Shurtleff, 189 U.S. at 318–19.
41. Myers, 272 U.S. at 172. Taft acknowledged “later acts . . . in which, doubtless, the
inconsistency with the independent power of the President to remove is clearer,” presumably because Congress specified removal “for cause” and for no other reason. Id. But he argued that these other statutes had “not . . . really . . . received the acquiescence of the executive branch of the Government.” Id.
42. Id. at 262 n.30 (Brandeis, J., dissenting). As explained below, Congress amended
the Board of General Appraisers statute after Shurtleff to limit the President’s removal authority to the three specified reasons “and no other.” See infra Part I.C.3.
43. Humphrey’s Ex’r v. United States, 295 U.S. 602, 621–23, 626–29, 631–32 (1935).
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malfeasance in office.” 44 President Hoover had appointed William
E. Humphrey to a seven-year term on the FTC ending in 1938, but
President Roosevelt removed him in 1933 because, as Roosevelt
put it in a letter: “I do not feel that your mind and my mind go
along together on either the policies or the administering of the
Federal Trade Commission.” 45 After Humphrey died, his estate
pursued a lawsuit for his salary in the Court of Claims. 46
Writing for the Supreme Court, Justice Sutherland reasoned
that the President lacked the authority to remove a commissioner
other than for the three grounds specified in the statute, 47 and that
this limitation on the President’s removal authority was constitutional. 48 In concluding that the statute limited the President’s ability to remove commissioners, the Court distinguished Shurtleff’s
holding that the 1890 statute authorizing the President to remove
members of the Board for “inefficiency, neglect of duty, or malfeasance in office” did not prohibit removal for other reasons. 49
Though the operative language in the Board and FTC statutes was
the same—“inefficiency, neglect of duty, or malfeasance in office”—
Justice Sutherland concluded that the statutory schemes, taken as
a whole, were different. According to Sutherland, Shurtleff had
held that the three listed bases were not exclusive in the Board
statute because “no term of office was fixed by the act.” 50 If
Shurtleff had held that a member of the Board possessed “the right
to hold office during his life or until found guilty of some act specified in the statute, the result . . . would be a complete revolution,”
because (apart from Article III judges) “no civil officer had ever
held office by life tenure since the foundation of the government.” 51
Because the FTC statute specified a term of years for commissioners, Sutherland concluded, Humphrey’s case was “wholly different”
from Shurtleff’s. 52 As a result, Humphrey’s Executor held that ordinarily “the fixing of a definite term subject to removal for

44. Federal Trade Commission Act, Pub. L. No. 63-203, § 1, 38 Stat. 717, 718 (1914).
45. Humphrey’s Ex’r, 295 U.S. at 618–19.
46. Id. at 618.
47. Id. at 618, 621–26 (distinguishing Shurtleff).
48. See id. at 626–32 (distinguishing Myers).
49. See id. at 621–23; see also Shurtleff v. United States, 189 U.S. 311, 318–19 (1903).
50. See Humphrey’s Ex’r, 295 U.S. at 622.
51. Id. Shurtleff contained some language to this effect. See Shurtleff, 189 U.S. at 316
(declining to “attribute an intention on the part of Congress to make such an extraordinary
change in the usual rule governing the tenure of office”).
52. Humphrey’s Ex’r, 295 U.S. at 623.
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cause . . . is enough to establish the legislative intent that the term
is not to be curtailed in the absence of such cause.” 53
Sutherland gave a second reason for construing the FTC statute
to limit the President’s authority to the three enumerated bases.
According to him, the FTC was “to be non-partisan; and . . . from
the very nature of its duties, [to] act with entire impartiality,” with
the commissioners “charged with the enforcement of no policy except the policy of the law.” 54 The Humphrey’s Executor opinion famously described the FTC’s duties as “neither political nor executive, but predominantly quasi-judicial and quasi-legislative.” 55
Sutherland derived that description of the FTC’s duties from legislative committee reports, which “clearly reflect[ed] the view that a
fixed term was necessary to the effective and fair administration
of the law.” 56
Some decades later, in Wiener v. United States, the Court held
that the President lacked the authority to remove members of the
War Claims Commission, a body created by Congress to adjudicate
claims for compensating certain internees, prisoners of war, and
religious organizations that suffered injuries at the hands of the
country’s enemies during World War II. 57 President Truman appointed Wiener (with the advice and consent of the Senate) to the
three-member body in 1950, but President Eisenhower fired him
in 1953. 58 Like the estates of Myers and Humphrey before him,
Wiener filed a suit for backpay in the Court of Claims contending
that his removal was illegal. 59 Unlike the statutes at issue in both
Myers and Humphrey’s Executor, however, the statutory scheme
establishing the War Claims Commission “made no provision for
removal of a Commissioner.” 60 As a result, the government contended, the case was controlled by the Court’s decision in Shurtleff,
which required “a clear statutory provision to the contrary” before

53. Id.
54. Id. at 624.
55. Id.
56. Id. As it happens, Justice Sutherland had been a participant in the legislative debates leading to the creation of the FTC as a Senator from the State of Utah. See CUSHMAN,
supra note 25, at 445.
57. 357 U.S. 349, 349–50, 356 (1958) (citing the War Claims Act of 1948, ch. 826, §§ 3,
5–7, 62 Stat. 1240, 1241–45).
58. Id. at 350.
59. Id. at 349.
60. See id. at 350.
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a limit to the President’s power to remove could be established, including for “judges” who comprised tribunals such as the Board of
General Appraisers. 61
Writing for a unanimous Court, Justice Frankfurter reasoned
that the lack of an express removal restriction was irrelevant because the statute’s silence was simply an instance in which appropriate inferences “must be drawn from congressional failure of explicitness.” 62 Taft’s opinion in Myers, according to Justice
Frankfurter, involved “obviously an executive official,” 63 and did
not (pursuant to Humphrey’s Executor) extend to removal of members of “quasi-judicial bodies.” 64 Humphrey’s Executor, according to
Frankfurter,
drew a sharp line of cleavage between officials who were part of the
Executive establishment and were thus removable by virtue of the
President’s constitutional powers, and those who are members of a
body “to exercise its judgment without the leave or hindrance of any
other official or any department of the government.” 65

The key question for the Court, Frankfurter concluded, was “the
difference in functions between those who are part of the Executive
establishment and those whose tasks require absolute freedom
from Executive interference.” 66 The Court held that, in creating the
War Claims Commission, Congress sought to establish “an adjudicating body with all the paraphernalia by which legal claims are
put to the test of proof, with finality of determination ‘not subject
to review by any other official of the United States or by any court

61. Brief for the United States at 31–32, Wiener, 357 U.S. 349 (No. 52); see id. at 75–77
(relying extensively on Shurtleff).
62. Wiener, 357 U.S. at 349, 352.
63. Id. at 351.
64. Id. at 352 (citing Humphrey’s Ex’r v. United States, 295 U.S. 602, 626–27 (1935)).
Justice Frankfurter contended that the Myers “Court announced that the President had
inherent constitutional power of removal also of officials who have ‘duties of a quasi-judicial
character . . . whose decisions after hearing affect interests of individuals, the discharge of
which the President can not in a particular case properly influence or control.’” Id. (quoting
Myers v. United States, 272 U.S. 52, 135 (1926)). Frankfurter reasoned that, if Congress
intended to bar
the President from influencing the Commission in passing on a particular
claim, a fortiori must it be inferred that Congress did not wish to have hang
over the Commission the Damocles’ sword of removal by the President for no
reason other than that he preferred to have on that Commission men of his
own choosing.
Id. at 356.
65. Id. at 353 (quoting Humphrey’s Ex’r, 295 U.S. at 625–26).
66. Id.
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by mandamus or otherwise.’” 67 Frankfurter did not mention
Shurtleff in the course of the opinion.
Later cases elaborated on the holdings of Myers, Humphrey’s Executor, and Wiener. In Morrison v. Olson, the Court appeared to
abandon Humphrey’s Executor’s distinction between “purely executive” and “quasi-judicial” or “quasi-legislative” officers, holding
that the appropriate inquiry depended not on “rigid categories,”
but rather on whether Congress “interfere[d] with the President’s”
constitutional powers or “impede[d] the President’s ability to perform his constitutional duty.” 68 In Free Enterprise Fund v. Public
Co. Accounting Oversight Board, the Court held that two layers of
for-cause protection violated the Constitution, even if one might be
permissible under Humphrey’s Executor. 69 But Myers, Humphrey’s
Executor, and Wiener remain central to constitutional doctrine.
Two of the cases, Myers and Wiener, were written by the crucial
players in the events of 1912 and 1913, President Taft and Felix
Frankfurter, 70 and the third case, Humphrey’s Executor, was written by George Sutherland, who had a role as a spectator of the
events from his seat as a senator during the relevant debates. 71
2. Statutory Framework
In addition to constitutional concerns, provisions limiting the
President’s authority to remove an officer may present legal questions about the meaning of the “inefficiency, neglect of duty, or malfeasance in office” language that Congress often uses to mark “independence” from the President. The Supreme Court’s jurisprudence has been surprisingly silent on this statutory question.
In Humphrey’s Executor, President Roosevelt had previously written letters to Commissioner Humphrey expressing the views that
67. Id. at 354–55 (quoting the War Claims Act of 1948, ch. 826, § 11, 62 Stat. 1240,
1246); see id. at 355 (reasoning that Congress could have authorized a court to adjudicate
the claims and “[t]he fact that it chose to establish a Commission to ‘adjudicate according to
law’ . . . did not alter the intrinsic judicial character of the task with which the Commission
was charged”).
68. Morrison v. Olson, 487 U.S. 654, 689–91 (1988); see id. at 692–93 (evaluating
whether a removal restriction “impermissibly burdens” or “interfere[s] impermissibly” with
the President’s constitutional obligations).
69. See Free Enter. Fund v. Pub. Co. Accounting Oversight Bd., 561 U.S. 477, 492–96
(2010).
70. Wiener, 357 U.S. at 349; Myers v. United States, 272 U.S. 52, 106 (1926).
71. Humphrey’s Ex’r v. United States, 295 U.S. 602, 618 (1935); see HADLEY ARKES,
THE RETURN OF GEORGE SUTHERLAND: RESTORING A JURISPRUDENCE OF NATURAL RIGHTS
15–18 (1994) (recounting Sutherland’s time in the Senate).
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the President wanted “personnel of [his] own selection” on the FTC
and that “[Humphrey’s] mind and [his] mind [did not] go along together on either the policies or the administering of the Federal
Trade Commission.” 72 In the ultimate order of removal, however,
the President did not purport to satisfy any of the statutory
grounds for removal, 73 and thus the precise scope of the statutory
language was not an issue presented to the Court. 74
In Bowsher v. Synar, 75 the Court understood the statute authorizing Congress to remove the Comptroller General for several statutory grounds—including “inefficiency,” “neglect of duty,” and
“malfeasance” in office—as being “very broad” and capable of sustaining removal “for any number of actual or perceived transgressions of the legislative will.” 76 In Morrison v. Olson, the Court described a provision authorizing removal for “good cause” as
conferring “ample authority to assure that [a subordinate officer]
is competently performing his or her statutory responsibilities in a
manner that comports with the provisions of the Act.” 77 At the
same time, in Free Enterprise Fund, the Court claimed that if officers in a multimember commission are protected against removal
under a statutory standard similar to that in Humphrey’s Executor,
then the President may not remove the officers merely where “the
President disagrees with their determination” in a particular matter. 78
Given the lack of clarity in Supreme Court cases, lower courts
have struggled with this question. In PHH Corp. v. Consumer Financial Protection Bureau, the en banc D.C. Circuit Court of Appeals upheld the constitutionality of a statute providing that the
President may remove the Director of the Consumer Financial Protection Bureau for “inefficiency, neglect of duty, or malfeasance in
72. Humphrey’s Ex’r, 295 U.S. at 618–19.
73. Id. at 619.
74. See Bowsher v. Synar, 478 U.S. 714, 729 n.8 (1986) (noting that in Humphrey’s Executor, “the President did not assert that he had removed the Federal Trade Commissioner
in compliance with one of the enumerated statutory causes for removal” (citing Humphrey’s
Ex’r, 295 U.S. at 612 (argument of Solicitor General Reed)); see also WILLIAM E.
LEUCHTENBURG, THE SUPREME COURT REBORN: THE CONSTITUTIONAL REVOLUTION IN THE
AGE OF ROOSEVELT 60–62 (1996) (indicating that Roosevelt regretted failing to specify cause
for Humphrey’s removal).
75. 478 U.S. at 726–28 (holding unconstitutional Congress’s delegation of executive authority to the Comptroller General because Congress could remove him by joint resolution).
76. Id. at 729.
77. 487 U.S. 654, 692 (1988).
78. Free Enter. Fund v. Pub. Co. Accounting Oversight Bd., 561 U.S. 477, 496 (2010).
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office.” 79 In an opinion concurring in the judgment, Judge Griffith
argued that the “inefficiency, neglect of duty, or malfeasance in office” standard imposes “only a minimal restriction on the President’s removal power, even permitting him to remove the Director
for ineffective policy choices.” 80 To understand the terms, Judge
Griffith’s opinion relied on dictionary definitions of the statutory
terms, state-law cases, and legislative debates. 81 Based on these
sources, Judge Griffith understood “malfeasance” to mean “the doing of that which ought not to be done; wrongful conduct, especially
official misconduct; violation of a public trust or obligation; specifically the doing of an act which is positively unlawful or wrongful,
in contradistinction to misfeasance.” 82 He understood “neglect of
duty” to mean “failure to do something that one is bound to do.” 83
And he understood inefficiency to mean failure “to produce or accomplish the agency’s ends, as understood or dictated by the President operating within the parameters set by Congress.” 84 In reaching these conclusions, Judge Griffith observed that he had not
removed the “concept of ‘independence’ from ‘independent’ agen-

79. 881 F.3d 75, 77 (D.C. Cir. 2018) (en banc); see 12 U.S.C. § 5491(c)(3) (2012).
80. PHH Corp., 881 F.3d at 124 (Griffith, J., concurring). Judge Griffith contended that,
“[u]ntil we know what these causes for removal mean and how difficult they are to satisfy,
we cannot determine whether the CFPB’s novel structural features unconstitutionally impede the President in his faithful execution of the laws.” Id. at 126. As Judge Griffith’s opinion observes, attempting to discover the ordinary meaning of the “inefficiency, neglect of
duty, or malfeasance in office” language poses a couple of conceptual difficulties. For one
thing, Congress enacted statutes containing this language at various points in time—indeed, separated by over 100 years in the case of the Interstate Commerce Commission and
the Consumer Financial Protection Bureau—thus raising the question whether the language should be given one uniform interpretation across the United States Code or different
interpretations in the different statutes. See id. at 130–31 (quoting Smith v. City of Jackson,
544 U.S. 228, 233 (2005), which stated that “[w]hen Congress uses the same language in
two statutes having similar purposes . . . it is appropriate to presume that Congress intended that text to have the same meaning in both statutes” (second alteration in original)).
For another, assuming (as Judge Griffith did) that Congress intends to give the “inefficiency,
neglect of duty, malfeasance in office” language the same meaning in all statutes using those
terms, there is a second question whether the meaning was fixed at the time the terms were
first incorporated into federal statutory law in the Interstate Commerce Act in 1887—or at
some earlier or later date. See id. at 130 (noting that “[g]enerally, the ordinary meaning of
a statutory term is fixed at the time the statute was adopted”).
81. Id. at 130, 131–32 & nn.10–12, 133.
82. Id. at 131 (quoting Malfeasance, THE CENTURY DICTIONARY AND CYCLOPEDIA 3593
(1911)).
83. Id. (citing Duty; Neglect, A LAW DICTIONARY 404–05, 810 (Henry Campbell Black
ed., 2d ed. 1910)).
84. Id. at 134.
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cies because agency independence is not a binary but rather a matter of degree.” 85 Responding to Judge Griffith’s concurrence, Judge
Wilkins agreed that “‘inefficiency’ provides a broad standard allowing for the removal of employees whose performance is found lacking,” including “incompetence or deficient performance.” 86 But he
disagreed that “‘inefficiency’ is properly construed to allow removal
for mere policy disagreements.” 87
B. Tariff Rates and Tariff Administration
Taft’s 1913 removal of Sharretts and Chamberlain occurred
against the backdrop of political debates about tariff rates and tariff administration. To appreciate the significance of the Board (and,
hence, the significance of Taft’s removal of two of its members), it
is necessary to understand the role the tariff played in the political
and economic development of nineteenth-century America. 88 All
governments—indeed, almost all collective enterprises—depend,
in some way, on the ability to pool resources to pursue a common
end. Until the adoption of the income and corporate taxes in the
twentieth century, the tariff was the principal mechanism by
which the federal government financed itself. 89 As a result, tariff
rates and tariff administration were two of the most politically salient issues throughout the nineteenth century. 90
1. Tariff Rates
The existence of a tariff of some sort on the North American continent predates the creation of the United States of America. The
English sought to impose a tariff on American goods and, indeed,
85.
86.
87.
88.

Id. at 136 (citation omitted).
Id. at 122 (Wilkins, J., concurring).
Id. at 123.
See EDWARD S. KAPLAN & THOMAS W. RYLEY, PRELUDE TO TRADE WARS: AMERICAN
TARIFF POLICY, 1890–1922, at ix (1994); see also CARL E. PRINCE & MOLLIE KELLER, THE
U.S. CUSTOMS SERVICE: A BICENTENNIAL HISTORY, at ii (1989) (observing that, in addition
to enforcing tariff regulations and collecting duties, the Customs Service was “the nation’s
first public health service, its first immigration service, and its first coast guard”).
89. See PRINCE & KELLER, supra note 88, at 36 (noting that customs duties provided
eighty-eight percent of the national government’s revenue from 1789 to 1800). To use another metric, by 1792, the Customs Service had 146 officers and 332 subordinates, far more
than any other civil establishment of the national government, and, by Thomas Jefferson’s
election in 1801, the number of subordinate employees had increased to 944. Id. at 37.
90. See KAPLAN & RYLEY, supra note 88, at 1–4 (discussing the political environment of
tariffs in the nineteenth century).
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it was a series of missteps by the British Parliament on customs
duties and enforcement that played a key role in fueling the American Revolution—first, the imposition of duties under the Stamp
Act of 1765; then, the creation of the American Board of Customs
Commissioners in the tinderbox town of Boston under the Townshend Act of 1767; and finally, the disastrous attempt to compel obedience under the Coercive Acts of 1774. 91 After the Constitution’s
adoption, 92 the creation of a national customs service was one of
the early items debated in the House of Representatives, at which
point James Madison argued that Congress’s “first attention and
united exertions” ought to be remedying the “deficiency in our
Treasury” with “an impost on articles imported into the United
States.” 93 Congress enacted, and President Washington signed into
law on July 31, 1789, a bill establishing the United States Customs
Service. 94 The Tariff Act of 1789 imposed specific duties on certain
goods (for example, eight to ten cents per gallon on spirits) and ad
valorem duties on others (for example, a fifteen percent tax on carriages). 95
Broadly speaking, there were two reasons to set high tariff rates.
The first, as suggested by Madison, was simple: to fund the government. The second reason—protection of domestic industries—
remains highly disputed to this day and would become the basis
for substantial political controversy throughout the nation’s first
century. In his “Report on Manufactures,” submitted to Congress

91. See DALL W. FORSYTHE, TAXATION AND POLITICAL CHANGE IN THE YOUNG NATION,
1781–1833, at 10–13 (1977) (discussing how the Stamp Act of 1765 and the Townshend Act
of 1767, among others, helped lead to the American Revolution); PRINCE & KELLER, supra
note 88, at 1–34 (discussing how British customs in America contributed to the start of the
American Revolution).
92. For a survey of American tariff practices from Independence to the adoption of the
Constitution, see 1 JOHN D. GOSS, THE HISTORY OF TARIFF ADMINISTRATION IN THE UNITED
STATES: FROM COLONIAL TIMES TO THE MCKINLEY ADMINISTRATIVE BILL 12–23 (2d ed.
1897); see also FORSYTHE, supra note 91, at 14–21 (discussing revenue and tax systems under the Articles of Confederation). The Constitution provided that “Congress shall have
Power To lay and collect Taxes, Duties, Imposts and Excises, to pay the Debts and provide
for the common Defence and general Welfare of the United States; but all Duties, Imposts
and Excises shall be uniform throughout the United States.” U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 1.
93. William Von Raab, Introduction to PRINCE & KELLER, supra note 88, at v–vi.
94. Act of July 31, 1789, ch. 5, 1 Stat. 29 (“An Act to regulate the Collection of the Duties . . . .”); see also Act of July 4, 1789, ch. 2, 1 Stat. 24 (“An Act for laying a Duty on Goods,
Wares and Merchandises . . . .”).
95. PERCY ASHLEY, MODERN TARIFF HISTORY: GERMANY—UNITED STATES—FRANCE
134 (3d ed. 1920).

BAMZAI AC 524 (AS (DO NOT DELETE)

708

UNIVERSITY OF RICHMOND LAW REVIEW

4/17/2018 3:26 PM

[Vol. 52:691

in December 1791, Alexander Hamilton provided a classic exposition of the arguments for a protective tariff. 96 Hamilton contended
that a protective (not merely revenue-raising) tariff was desirable
for several reasons. First, Hamilton claimed, “[e]very nation . . .
ought to endeavor to possess within itself all the essentials of national supply,” such as “the means of subsistence, habitation, clothing, and defense.” 97 Second, Hamilton argued that a protective tariff would encourage “an extensive domestic market for the surplus
produce of the soil.” 98 Third, Hamilton argued that America’s infant industries would “struggle against the force of unequal
terms”—namely, the established industries of European powers. 99
Finally, Hamilton claimed that any temporary increase in prices
resulting from the tariff would soon be overtaken by a decrease in
prices from the resulting increase in domestic production. 100
By the time tariff bills were enacted in 1819, 1824, and 1828, the
question had become embroiled in party and sectional politics.
Southern interests generally favored lower rates, and mid-Atlantic
interests favored higher rates. 101 Famously, in 1832, a state convention in South Carolina gathered to declare the Tariff Acts of
1828 and 1832 to be void within the state, under the theory that
each individual state had the authority to nullify unconstitutional
acts (as perceived by that state) of the federal government. 102 Following an interlude during the Civil War, the tariff returned as a
major issue—and a partisan one at that. 103 Expecting heavy losses
at the polls in 1875, Republicans elected to pursue a last-ditch effort to entrench high protective rates before losing control of Congress. Following that point, “[a]t almost every succeeding period of
congressional or presidential election until 1896 the tariff was an

96.
97.

See id. at 136.
ALEXANDER HAMILTON, REPORT ON MANUFACTURES TO THE HOUSE OF
REPRESENTATIVES, H.R. REP. NO. 63-172, at 33 (1791).
98. Id. at 16.
99. See id. at 20.
100. Id. at 44; ASHLEY, supra note 95, at 136–37.
101. ASHLEY, supra note 95, at 146 n.3, 147, 150–51.
102. Id. at 158. Whether levying of import duties for protective purposes was constitutionally within the power of Congress was the subject of controversy. See 1 EDWARD
STANWOOD, AMERICAN TARIFF CONTROVERSIES IN THE NINETEENTH CENTURY 220–25
(1903).
103. ASHLEY, supra note 95, at 182.
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issue in the canvass, to the great disturbance and distress of business, and during the short period of fourteen years, from 1883 to
1897, there were four complete revisions of the tariff.” 104
In 1887, President Grover Cleveland, in his annual address to
Congress, unequivocally embraced a platform of lower duties—
thus effectively making it the policy of his Democratic Party, which
had hitherto been divided on the subject. 105 Cleveland argued that,
while the tariff “must be extensively continued as the source of the
Government’s income,” the tariff should not “always insure the realization of immense profits, instead of moderately profitable returns.” 106 In his view, the “simple and plain duty which [the national government] owe[d] to the people, [was] to reduce taxation
to the necessary expenses of an economical operation of the Government.” 107 Cleveland’s message prompted competing bills by Republicans and Democrats and, “[f]rom that time on, the tariff question became the chief line of division between the two great
political parties.” 108
2. Tariff Administration
Against this backdrop, it should come as no surprise that administering the tariff system was difficult. To assess accurately an ad
valorem tax on an item subject to a protective tariff required an
“intimate knowledge of its innumerable grades, qualities and textures; an extensive acquaintance with foreign markets, with
freight rates, commissions, insurance and a multitude of details
104. 2 EDWARD STANWOOD, AMERICAN TARIFF CONTROVERSIES IN THE NINETEENTH
CENTURY 191 (1903).
105. See KAPLAN & RYLEY, supra note 88, at 1–2.
106. EDWARD MCPHERSON, A HAND-BOOK OF POLITICS FOR 1888: BEING A RECORD OF
IMPORTANT POLITICAL ACTION, EXECUTIVE AND LEGISLATIVE, NATIONAL AND STATE, FROM
JULY 31, 1886, TO AUGUST 31, 1888, at 93 (1888).
107. E. Benjamin Andrews, A History of the Last Quarter-Century in the United States,
19 SCRIBNER’S MAG. 60, 80 (1896).
108. ASHLEY, supra note 95, at 198 n.1 (quoting RICHMOND MAYO-SMITH & EDWIN R.A.
SELIGMAN, THE COMMERCIAL POLICY OF THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, 1860–1890, at 23
(1892)); see IDA M. TARBELL, THE TARIFF IN OUR TIMES 155–80 (1911) (discussing the two
resulting, competing bills: the Democrats’ Mills Bill and the Republicans’ Allison Bill); see
also ASHLEY, supra note 95, at 198 (noting that “[t]he message established a distinct line of
division between political parties . . . and it provided a clear and definite issue for the Presidential election of November, 1888”); TARBELL, supra, at 154 (noting that “[t]he immediate
important political result of [Cleveland’s] message was that it crystallized tariff sentiment
in both parties”); F.W. TAUSSIG, TARIFF HISTORY OF THE UNITED STATES 253 (8th ed. 1931)
(reasoning that Cleveland’s message made the tariff “question more distinctly a party matter than it had been at any time since the Civil War”).
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imperfectly acquired even by a lifelong business experience.” 109 Enforcing the customs acts, thus, required officials who possessed a
great deal of expertise and who were vested with a great deal of
discretion.
Early customs acts created several officers—collectors, naval officers, surveyors, and deputy collectors—to enforce the tariff
laws. 110 But for all the administrative complexity, before 1818, the
law customarily accepted an invoice submitted by the importer as
showing the dutiable value of the goods. 111 In 1818, however, Congress created the office of “appraiser,” authorizing the President to
appoint two such officers at each of the ports of Boston, New York,
Philadelphia, Charleston, and New Orleans. 112 These appraisers

109. GOSS, supra note 92, at 8 (“[T]he adoption of the policy of protection . . . and the very
general introduction of ad valorem rates vastly complicated the problem.”).
110. Id. at 24–32 (surveying early tariff administration structure). The enforcement
framework implicates two additional issues of relevance to administrative law scholars.
First, in the early Republic, “[t]he salaries of officers were supposed to be paid out of the
moneys received from fees” unless those fees were inadequate, in which case they were “paid
directly out of the revenue.” Id. at 54; see Act of Mar. 3, 1849, ch. 110, § 1, 9 Stat. 398, 398
(providing that the “gross amount of all duties received from customs . . . shall be paid by
the officer or agent receiving the same into the treasury of the United States . . . without
any abatement or deduction on account of salary”); see also Act of May 12, 1870, ch. 102, §
2, 16 Stat. 122, 123 (providing that collectors were to receive certain fixed salaries). The
transition from “profit motive” to salaried employee thus furnishes an important example
of the changing nature of funding for federal functions. See NICHOLAS R. PARRILLO, AGAINST
THE PROFIT MOTIVE: THE SALARY REVOLUTION IN AMERICAN GOVERNMENT, 1780–1940, at 1
(2013). Second, customs officers initially obtained a warrant from a justice of the peace to
enter private premises, to seize goods on unpaid duties, and to remain and to remove for
inspection any books or papers containing relevant information. Act of Mar. 2, 1799, ch. 22,
§ 68, 1 Stat. 627, 677–78; GOSS, supra note 92, at 60. In 1863, Congress authorized United
States District Court Judges to issue warrants on affidavit that an importer had committed
or attempted fraud. Act of Mar. 3, 1863, ch. 76, § 7, 12 Stat. 737, 740; GOSS, supra note 92,
at 60. Later, Congress abolished this provision altogether. GOSS, supra note 92, at 66. Instead, it provided that, after the commencement of a suit for forfeiture, the government’s
attorney could compel production of papers by written motion with the court. Act of June
22, 1874, ch. 391, § 5, 18 Stat. 186, 187; GOSS, supra note 92, at 66 (noting that “[t]his
entirely took away the great facilities formerly offered for obtaining evidence in the preparation of a suit, and greatly limited the opportunity for procuring evidence during the prosecution of the suit”).
111. GOSS, supra note 92, at 34.
112. Act of Apr. 20, 1818, ch. 79, § 9, 3 Stat. 433, 435–36. Later acts created additional
appraisers and assistant appraisers in some ports. See, e.g., Act of July 27, 1866, ch. 284, §§
1–2, 14 Stat. 302, 302; Act of Aug. 30, 1842, ch. 270, § 16, 5 Stat. 548, 563–64; Act of May
28, 1830, ch. 147, §§ 1–2, 4 Stat. 409, 409. In 1830, for example, Congress created a more
elaborate scheme for appointing temporary appraisers from the public. See Act of May 28,
1830 §§ 1–2, 4 Stat. at 409; GOSS, supra note 92, at 42 (noting that where a collector deemed
an appraisement too low, he might direct a reappraisement by the principal appraisers to
three merchants and, if the importer was dissatisfied, he was to apply to the collector, who
would appoint one merchant, who would appoint another; in the case of disagreement, the
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were required to “faithfully . . . inspect and examine . . . goods
[and] to report . . . the true value thereof when purchased.” 113
Along with a third person—a disinterested resident merchant selected by the importer—they acted as a board of appraisement
when the collector determined there were “just grounds to suspect
that goods, wares, or merchandise . . . ha[d] been invoiced below
the true value.” 114 A further law in 1828 made appraisal mandatory, rather than discretionary, in the case of ad valorem taxes. 115
Judicial control of customs decisions initially occurred through
common-law suits against the officers. 116 In 1839, Congress created
an administrative appeal from the collector to the Secretary of the
Treasury, 117 which the Supreme Court held displaced the old common-law system in Cary v. Curtis. 118 The Cary decision prompted
separate dissents by Justices Story and McLean. Story contended
that the Court had unconstitutionally allowed Congress to replace
citizens’ “right of action in any court to recover back money claimed
illegally . . . by its officers under colour of law” with the Treasury
Secretary’s “sole and exclusive authority to withhold or restore
that money according to his own notions of justice or right.” 119 In
two merchants would appoint an umpire). In 1842, Congress provided that where the importer was dissatisfied with the appraisement, the collector would appoint “two discreet and
experienced merchants,” who would conduct an appraisal and, if they disagreed, “the collector [should] decide between them.” Act of Aug. 30, 1842 § 17, 5 Stat. at 564. In 1866, a single
appraiser was assigned to New York, with ten assistants appointed by the Secretary of the
Treasury to act below him. Act of July 27, 1866 §§ 1–2, 14 Stat. at 302.
113. Act of Apr. 20, 1818 § 9, 3 Stat. at 435–36.
114. Id. §§ 9, 11, 3 Stat. at 436; see GOSS, supra note 92, at 34.
115. Act of May 19, 1828, ch. 55, 4 Stat. 270; GOSS, supra note 92, at 40.
116. See GOSS, supra note 92, at 54 (noting that “collectors were allowed to retain certain
amounts to meet [such] suits”).
117. Act of Mar. 3, 1839, ch. 82, § 2, 5 Stat. 339, 348–49; see GOSS, supra note 92, at 54–
55.
118. 44 U.S. (3 How.) 236, 252 (1845).
119. Id. at 253 (Story, J., dissenting). As Story characterized it, the Court’s interpretation of the statute wrongly permitted “substitution of executive authority and discretion for
judicial remedies.” Id. at 256. He expressed concern that “if Congress possess a constitutional authority to vest such summary and final power of interpretation in an executive
functionary, I know no other subject within the reach of legislation which may not be exclusively confided in the same way to an executive functionary; nay, to the executive himself.”
Id. at 253. In a separate opinion, Justice McLean reached the same conclusion. See id. at
263 (McLean, J., dissenting) (reasoning that the Court’s interpretation of the statute “[i]n a
matter of private right . . . takes from the judiciary the power of construing the law, and
vests it in the secretary of the Treasury”). The opinions thus presented the difficult line
between “public rights” and “private rights,” with which the Supreme Court has struggled.
See, e.g., Stern v. Marshall, 564 U.S. 462, 489–90 (2011); Crowell v. Benson, 285 U.S. 22,
50–51 (1932). Indeed, Story claimed that “[t]he line of discrimination between fabrics and
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response to Cary, Congress expressly permitted suits against the
collector (so long as the importer had exhausted appeal to the Secretary of the Treasury), while providing that the government
would pay judgments on the collector’s behalf. 120
Over time, the duties of the appraisers became more “court-like.”
In 1832, Congress authorized appraisers to summon and examine
witnesses to determine the value of imported merchandise and to
require the production of letters, accounts, and invoices. 121 In 1851,
Congress authorized the President to appoint four general “appraisers of merchandise,” who could be assigned to ports as the
Secretary of the Treasury saw fit. 122 In the case of an “appeal” from
the regular appraisers, a general appraiser, along with a merchant
selected by the port collector, would appraise the goods together. 123
C. The Formation and Development of the Board of General
Appraisers
1. The Creation of the Board of General Appraisers
The election in 1888 of a Republican President, Benjamin Harrison, swept Republicans into power in both the House and Senate,
giving one party the ability to shape tariff rates and administration
along its own policy lines. 124 In April 1890, a certain William
McKinley—at that time the Chairman of the Committee on Ways
and Means in the House of Representatives, later the twenty-fifth
articles approaching near to each other in quality, or component materials, or commercial
denominations, is . . . sometimes exceedingly obscure . . . [and] therefore . . . fit for judicial
inquiry and decision.” Cary, 44 U.S. (3 How.) at 256. But he had earlier decided that the
ascertainment of “all ad valorem duties” by executive branch appraisers could be made “conclusive” in common-law causes of action. Tappan v. United States, 23 F. Cas. 690, 691
(C.C.D. Mass. 1822) (No. 13,749); Caleb Nelson, Adjudication in the Political Branches, 107
COLUM. L. REV. 559, 580 & n.80 (2007).
120. Act of Feb. 26, 1845, ch. 22, 5 Stat. 727. Initially, Congress repealed the administrative remedy of appeal to the Secretary altogether, but later it reestablished the administrative remedy while keeping the judicial remedy. See Act of Mar. 3, 1857, ch. 98, § 5, 11
Stat. 192, 195.
121. Act of July 14, 1832, ch. 227, § 8, 4 Stat. 583, 592; see GOSS, supra note 92, at 45.
122. Act of Mar. 3, 1851, ch. 38, § 3, 9 Stat. 629, 630.
123. Id.; see GOSS, supra note 92, at 56 (noting that this mechanism introduced a “professional element . . . thus . . . removing [the reappraisement] still further from any influence of the importer”).
124. See KAPLAN & RYLEY, supra note 88, at 2; see also HARRY J. SIEVERS, BENJAMIN
HARRISON: HOOSIER PRESIDENT, THE WHITE HOUSE AND AFTER 3–23, 181 (1968); HARRY J.
SIEVERS, BENJAMIN HARRISON: HOOSIER STATESMAN, FROM THE CIVIL WAR TO THE WHITE
HOUSE, 1865–1888, at 425–29 (1959).
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President of the United States—introduced a tariff bill (“McKinley
Tariff Act”), beginning a process that, over decades, “raised duties
to their highest levels in U.S. history.” 125 The most notable innovation of the bill, when it came to rates, was the extension of the tariff
to agriculture. 126 In terms of administration, a “characteristic feature” of the McKinley Tariff Act was the “increased elaborateness
of the classification adopted,” which “greatly increase[d] the difficulty of customs administration.” 127
At the same time, Congress enacted a companion bill, known as
the Customs Administrative Act of June 10, 1890 (“Customs Administrative Act”), which rearranged the organization of the customs service. 128 Under the Customs Administrative Act, which was
also introduced by McKinley, 129 all imported goods were to be accompanied by an invoice containing a statement of costs. 130 The
goods were then valued by an “appraiser” and, where the duty was
ad valorem and the valuation by the appraiser exceeded the valuation of the invoice, a double duty would be levied on the difference. 131
As part of the Customs Administrative Act, Congress established the Board, composed of nine members who would occupy the
office of general appraiser of merchandise. 132 Section 12 of the Customs Administrative Act provided that the appraisers “shall be appointed by the President”; that “[n]ot more than five of such general appraisers shall be appointed from the same political party”;
and that “[t]hey . . . may be removed from office at any time by the

125. KAPLAN & RYLEY, supra note 88, at 1–2; see ASHLEY, supra note 95, at 204; see also
LEWIS L. GOULD, THE PRESIDENCY OF WILLIAM MCKINLEY 1 (1980); H. WAYNE MORGAN,
WILLIAM MCKINLEY AND HIS AMERICA 96–113 (rev. ed. 2003). McKinley earned his reputation as an ardent protectionist and was reportedly proud of his nickname “The Great Protector.” KAPLAN & RYLEY, supra note 88, at 2, 4.
126. ASHLEY, supra note 95, at 204.
127. Id. at 209–10.
128. Id. at 210. McKinley introduced the Customs Administrative Act “not [as] a bill to
change the rates of duty; it [was] purely an administrative bill.” 21 CONG. REC. 809 (1890)
(statement of Rep. McKinley).
129. U.S. GOV’T PRINTING OFFICE, 60TH CONG., CUSTOMS TARIFFS: SENATE AND HOUSE
REPORTS 1888, 1890, 1894, 1897, at 11 (1909).
130. ASHLEY, supra note 95, at 210.
131. Id. at 211.
132. See Customs Administrative Act of 1890, ch. 407, § 12, 26 Stat. 131, 136. Prior to
the creation of the Board, the Treasury Department achieved uniformity in customs administration through the use of “special agents” reporting directly to the Secretary of the Treasury. See Act of May 12, 1870, ch. 102, § 1, 16 Stat. 122, 122–23; GOSS, supra note 92, at 64–
65.
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President for inefficiency, neglect of duty, or malfeasance in office.” 133 The general appraisers were authorized to administer
oaths, compel testimony, and produce written materials. 134 The
Customs Administrative Act authorized an appeal from a collector
to the Board, where a panel of three would examine and decide the
case. 135 From the decision of the Board, the collector or the importer could file suit in a circuit court of the United States. 136
At the outset of the debate, McKinley observed that the creation
of the Board was one of “the two leading features of this bill now
upon which there may be contention.” 137 His observation proved
prescient. There was contention over the Board, in no small part
due to the novelty of the administrative apparatus that Congress
was considering. As Senator George Gray of Delaware put it, the
structure of the Board was “entirely new.” 138 In light of that novelty, as well as the high financial stakes, there followed a spirited
debate in both the House and the Senate on the constitutionality
of the administrative structure. The debate, however, was not principally over the Customs Administrative Act’s attempted restriction of the President’s removal power—about which there was
only a single express reference and two passing allusions.
Instead, objectors to the Customs Administrative Act focused on
two related lines of arguments. First, they contended that the Act,
by making the facts gathered by the Board final in the appeal to
the circuit courts, would deny “to citizens of this country engaged
in commerce . . . the constitutional right of a trial by jury.” 139 Second, they contended that the Board was not a “court” exercising
133. Customs Administrative Act of 1890, ch. 407, § 12, 26 Stat. 131, 136; see GOSS, supra note 92, at 81–83; see also Myers v. United States, 272 U.S. 52, 269–71, 271 n.51 (1926)
(Brandeis, J., dissenting) (discussing how Congress has required political representation to
restrict the President’s power to nominate). This article will bracket the question of partisan
balance requirements; for recent treatments, see generally Brian D. Feinstein & Daniel J.
Hemel, Partisan Balance with Bite, 118 COLUM. L. REV. 9 (2018); Ronald J. Krotoszynski,
Jr. et al., Partisan Balance Requirements in the Age of New Formalism, 90 NOTRE DAME L.
REV. 941 (2015).
134. Customs Administrative Act of 1890 § 16, 26 Stat. at 138–39; see GOSS, supra note
92, at 83.
135. ASHLEY, supra note 95, at 210–11; GOSS, supra note 92, at 82.
136. GOSS, supra note 92, at 82.
137. 21 CONG. REC. 810 (1890) (statement of Rep. McKinley).
138. Id. at 4012 (statement of Sen. Gray); see id. (statement of Sen. Allison) (agreeing
that the Board was a new apparatus “respecting the mode of the ascertainment of duties”
and had “never existed before”).
139. Id. at 811–12 (statement of Rep. Breckinridge of Arkansas). Commenting on Representative Breckinridge’s remarks, Representative Blanchard stated that “virtually
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“judicial power”—and, hence, its judgments could not be given conclusive effect. 140 This latter argument rested on the premise—articulated by Senator George Vest of Missouri—that the Board was
“not a court of law, not a court of general jurisdiction, but it is a
limited, ex parte revenue tribunal.” 141
In response to these two charges, McKinley and his allies had
two conceptually distinct arguments. First, they claimed that the
limitations that the Customs Administrative Act placed on appealing facts to the circuit courts were unproblematic because importers had “all the rights before the board of appraisers that [they]
den[ying] the right of appeal to the courts from the decision of a collector . . . . would be quite
a serious matter, and a dangerous innovation on the rights of the citizen.” Id. at 813 (statement of Rep. Blanchard); id. at 818 (statement of Rep. Breckinridge of Kentucky) (“I have
grave doubts whether it is constitutional thus to oust the courts of jurisdiction of the facts
in such cases or to wholly deprive a citizen of his right to a trial by jury.”); id. at 827 (statement of Rep. Kerr of Iowa) (arguing that the restriction on appeal and trial by jury violated
due process); id. (statement of Rep. Carlisle) (arguing that the provision was a “substantial
delegation of absolute authority to the executive officers of the United States Government
to decide for themselves what the tariff laws of this country are, without any appeal to the
courts”); id. at 844 (statement of Rep. Cummings) (describing the hearings before the Board
as “virtually a star chamber proceeding” with “justice in any case depend[ing] entirely upon
the uncontrollable decision of a number of men appointed solely for political reasons and
acting as partisans in the decision of disputed cases”); cf. id. at 4079 (statement of Sen.
Evarts) (“The question whether Congress could take away by other modifications the right
at common law. . . whether the preservation and full maintenance of the trial by jury would
or would not be an essential requisite for the methods that would be treated as maintaining
adequate remedies, has never been decided.”).
140. Id. at 825 (statement of Rep. Blanchard) (arguing that the Customs Administrative
Act “is a piratical craft sailing under deceptive colors” because it restricted “the right of trial
by jury and the right of appeal from an inferior court to a superior court”); id. at 4017 (statement of Sen. Gray) (“It will deprive importers of valuable rights , . . . in relegating them to
this imperfect adjudication of their rights by this special tribunal . . . not exercising the ordinary judicial powers which are invoked when a suit at common law is commenced . . . .”);
id. at 4072 (statement of Sen. Gray) (“[T]o preserve the right of trial by jury, to preserve the
right by a common-law suit to invoke the judicial power of the land, is essential to preserve
these customs laws from being the mere instruments of tyranny in the hands of executive
officers.”). In this regard, objectors distinguished between “the ascertainment of the value
of the property upon which the tax is to be paid,” which could be determined administratively, and the “matter of classification in rates,” which could be determined only judicially.
Id. at 4079 (statement of Sen. Call).
141. Id. at 4006 (statement of Sen. Vest); see also id. (statement of Sen. Vest) (referring
to “the loose discretion of boards with ex parte jurisdiction” and characterizing the Board as
“an ex parte, star-chamber, revenue tribunal”). Supporters of the Customs Administrative
Act agreed with this premise. See id. (statement of Sen. Allison) (agreeing that the Board
was “not a court in any sense”); id. at 4011 (statement of Sen. Aldrich) (“The ascertainment
of value is not in the nature of a judicial determination. It is the case of a board of experts
deciding in a summary manner questions of value arising under our tariff laws. We are not
erecting a judicial tribunal to hear and determine causes as a court.”); id. (statement of Sen.
Hiscock) (arguing that it would be “pernicious” to treat “taxing officers . . . substantially as
courts or as tribunals to be governed by the rules and proceedings of courts in reference to
the discharge of their duties”).
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would have in a court.” 142 Second, they claimed that private citizens had no constitutional right to a jury trial or an independent
factual judgment by an Article III court in tariff cases. As one supporter of the provision, Representative Sereno Payne of New York,
argued, the federal government
was supreme in its power of levying and collecting taxes, and that if
they allowed a suit in any case it was only an act of clemency and
beneficence on the part of the Government; that they need not allow
any claim for redress, but they might make the Secretary of the Treasury the supreme tribunal in the case, both as to the law and as to the
facts, and take away entirely the right of trial by jury. 143

Another supporter—Representative Joseph McKenna, who was
later appointed by McKinley to be an Associate Justice of the Supreme Court—contended that critics of the bill erred in believing
that the right to challenge tariffs was a “jural right” or a “natural
right the citizen possesses,” rather than “a privilege conferred on
him by the legislature.” 144
Precisely what Congress intended to accomplish with the removal restrictions in the Customs Administrative Act is hard to

142. Id. at 813 (statement of Rep. McKinley).
143. Id. at 818–19 (statement of Rep. Payne); id. at 818 (statement of Rep. Payne) (arguing at length, based on Supreme Court precedents, that “laws levying taxes and restricting the common-law right of trial by jury were constitutional”).
144. Id. at 828 (statement of Rep. McKenna); cf. id. at 830 (statement of Rep. Breckinridge of Kentucky) (disputing that “the Government grants ‘privileges’ to the citizen instead
of being itself the repository of the delegated powers granted by the citizen”). It is notable
that different congressmen drew different lessons from the history of common-law challenges to customs appraisals. Representative Thomas Bayne, for example, argued that
prior to 1839 common-law actions lay against the collectors of the customs revenue. From 1839 to 1845 the right of action was substantially denied to anybody . . . . In 1845 the common-law right of action was restored. In 1864, a statutory remedy was substituted which opened wide the door for litigation. The
particular purpose of the amendment which I propose, as well as the purpose
of this entire administrative bill, so far as it related to litigation, is to shut out
the great multitude of cases that are brought under the existing law.
Id. at 824 (statement of Rep. Bayne). From this history, Bayne contended that the Court’s
decision in Cary v. Curtis, denying the existence of a common-law remedy, conclusively established that no such remedy was constitutionally required. By contrast, Representative
Blanchard contended that, in the wake of Cary, “so great was the alarm of the country . . .
that Congress . . . forthwith passed an act giving back to the citizen his right of appeal to
the courts in such cases and of trial by jury,” which “is the law today and has been so from
1845 down to this time.” Id. at 825 (statement of Rep. Blanchard). On this perspective, Congress’s swift repudiation of Cary formed the legitimate constitutional baseline. See id. at
830 (statement of Rep. Blanchard) (“A majority of the court maintained the act of 1839, but
Justice Story dissented, and Congress then in session, enacted the law of 1845 to meet the
objections of Justice Story, and to draw the fangs of the act of 1839, which denied to the
citizen access to the court to recover his money paid under protest.”).
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determine. It appeared to be shared ground among the participants
in the debate that the appraisers were executive branch officers,
not judges. As Senator Vest put it, “the Government is always represented by a paid officer as an appraiser, put there for that purpose, whose functions belong to the Government, who represents
the Government.” 145 Nobody objected to Vest’s claim that the appraisers were, in a very real sense, agents of the executive branch.
At the same time, nobody expressly referred to, or sought to define, the “inefficiency, neglect of duty, or malfeasance in office” language. The sole member of Congress who mentioned the removal
provision was Representative Benton McMillin of Tennessee. He
argued that the members of the Board “hold their offices for life,
which is wrong.” 146 As he put it, the Board members “may be removed by the President for cause; but we all know what that
amounts to.” 147 The Board, according to McMillin, “virtually . . .
creat[ed] . . . several life offices at $7,000 a year.” 148 McMillin, in
short, clearly was aware of the existence of the removal provision,
understood it to be a significant limitation on presidential authority, and believed it to be “wrong.” He did not specify whether the
grounds for his objection were constitutional—in other words, that
the removal restriction was “wrong” because it was unconstitutional—or merely prudential.
Two further legislative statements illustrate the differing perspectives that legislators had about the Board’s administrative status. On the one hand, Senator Wilkinson Call suggested that there
was nothing “extraordinary” about the procedures of the Board because the appraisers would work with “the Secretary of the Treasury supervising.” 149 That statement suggested that the Secretary
would supervise the Board. On the other hand, Senator Sherman
declared that the Board would be constituted “of men of experience” who were “absolutely independent” and “free from political
embarrassments,” but still within the executive branch conducting

145. Id. at 4011 (statement of Sen. Vest); see id. at 4072 (statement of Sen. Gray) (characterizing appraisers as “executive officers”); id. at 4074 (statement of Sen. Call) (referring
to the “discretionary power committed to executive officers”).
146. Id. at 5341 (statement of Rep. McMillin).
147. Id. (statement of Rep. McMillin).
148. Id. (statement of Rep. McMillin).
149. Id. at 4081 (statement of Sen. Call). Senator Call’s remarks mirrored those he made
during the debate over the Interstate Commerce Commission. See 18 CONG. REC. 570 (1887)
(statement of Sen. Call).
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“an administrative, not a judicial, proceeding.” 150 That suggested
the Board would be “independent” in some fashion.
Nevertheless, despite the general silence of the congressional
record, some informed speculation is possible: the authors and the
supporters of the Customs Administrative Act were well aware
that its provisions failed to give those who challenged customs determinations a jury trial managed by an Article III judge who was
subject to the Constitution’s tenure and salary protections. For
that reason, they sought to replace the constitutional protections
of jury trial and judicial determination with a reduced form of “independence”—namely, tenure protection under the “inefficiency,
neglect of duty, or malfeasance in office” standard. As Representative Thomas Bayne, a Republican from Pennsylvania, reasoned,
although the right of trial by jury as to questions of fact is taken away,
there is a substitute for the jury in the nine appraisers, skilled in their
work, having full knowledge of their business, having full and direct
information of the facts, and their finding will be far safer and more
in accord with the justice of the case than the verdict of a petit jury is
likely to be. 151

In a similar vein, Senator Sherman claimed that the Customs Administrative Act “provide[d] a substitute for the common-law remedy” by creating “impartial tribunals to ascertain facts,” composed
of members whose “judgment . . . upon a question of fact is worth
more than the judgment of fifty jurors or fifty juries.” 152 “Here is
an impartial verdict,” Sherman continued, “of three skilled and
competent men trained in the business, and how much better that
would be than a jury picked up in New York . . . .” 153 “Independ-

150. 21 CONG. REC. 4116 (1890) (statement of Sen. Sherman).
151. Id. at 825 (statement of Rep. Bayne). Bayne expressly tied the bill to the large number of pending cases. See id. (statement of Rep. Bayne).
152. Id. at 4021 (statement of Sen. Sherman); see also id. at 4075 (statement of Sen.
McPherson) (“Of all the cases that may go before a jury here is a case which the Senator
knows the jury in ninety-nine cases out of one hundred are incompetent to deal with intelligently or beneficially either to the Government or to the claimant. Therefore it was that
we proposed first to have the appraisement made by a board of experts.”). Senator Sherman,
of course, was the prime mover behind the famous Sherman Act, which Congress also passed
in 1890. See Act of July 2, 1890, ch. 647, 26 Stat. 209.
153. 21 CONG. REC. 4021 (1890) (statement of Sen. Sherman). Sherman remarked that,
if he had his way, he would “organize a special court” and that “the result will be in the end
that we shall have a customs court.” Id. (statement of Sen. Sherman). Sherman’s prediction
was to come true, but not for another sixty-six years. See infra notes 306–07 and accompanying text.
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ence” from the President, on this logic, would take the place of the
petit jury. 154
President Harrison appointed nine appraisers, among them
Thaddeus S. Sharretts and Ferdinand N. Shurtleff. 155 Both of them
would be removed by future Presidents. 156
2. The Shurtleff Controversy
The McKinley Tariff Act prompted “an immediate and violent
reaction,” which likely played a role in the Republicans’ mammoth
congressional losses in the 1890 midterm elections and in the presidential election of Grover Cleveland after a one-term hiatus in
1892. 157 It was followed in 1894 by a partial reduction in the tariff
(known as the “Wilson tariff”) and, after McKinley’s election as
President, in 1897 by an increase in the tariff (known as the
“Dingley tariff”). 158 The latter act, “[f]rom the administrative point
154. For an account of the Board suggesting that the constitutional concerns expressed
in the 1890 debate did not materialize, see FELIX FRANKFURTER & JAMES M. LANDIS, THE
BUSINESS OF THE SUPREME COURT: A STUDY IN THE FEDERAL JUDICIAL SYSTEM 148–52
(1928) (contending that despite the “expectation that the newly created Board of General
Appraisers would largely divert from the courts litigation over tariff clauses,” “the court
proceedings turned into trials de novo and not reviews of the findings of the Board of Appraisers” because of “the introduction of new evidence before the circuit courts”). Interestingly, Congress also appeared unsure whether it could “confer the power upon these executive officers [i.e., the Board] to summon witnesses and compel their attendance as a matter
of law.” 21 CONG. REC. 4016 (1890) (statement of Sen. Allison) (noting that the issue “was
discussed by the committee at great length a good many times, [which] finally decided that
[it] had not that power”); id. (statement of Sen. Vest) (noting that “very eminent courts have
decided [this issue] both ways”); cf. In re Pacific Ry. Comm’n, 32 F. 241, 267–68 (C.C. N.D.
Cal. 1887) (holding that an agency, not being a judicial body, lacks the power to compel
production of evidence).
155. 27 JOURNAL OF THE EXECUTIVE PROCEEDINGS OF THE SENATE OF THE UNITED
STATES OF AMERICA 705, 718 (1890).
156. President Asks Appraisers to Resign, CHI. DAILY TRIB., Jan. 24, 1899, at 1; Webb
Resolution Tabled: The Importers’ Side of the Story; Appraisers Sharretts and Robinson Removed by Taft, CROCKERY & GLASS J., Mar. 6, 1913, at 13 [hereinafter Webb Resolution
Tabled]. The volume of cases decided by the Board appears to have been high. See GOSS,
supra note 92, at 83 (“During the first three months after thair [sic] appointment, the general appraisers decided 779 cases of appeals on questions of value, 713 of which were in New
York.”).
157. ASHLEY, supra note 95, at 213; KAPLAN & RYLEY, supra note 88, at 4; see DOBSON,
supra note 18, at 19. Other issues likely played a role as well. See KAPLAN & RYLEY, supra
note 88, at 5.
158. KAPLAN & RYLEY, supra note 88, at 5, 8–10; see ASHLEY, supra note 95, at 213–23.
The tariffs were named after their chief sponsors in the House of Representatives, respectively William Wilson of West Virginia and Nelson Dingley, Jr., of Maine. KAPLAN & RYLEY,
supra note 88, at 5, 9. The Wilson tariff notably also imposed a tax of two percent on incomes
over $4000, which the Supreme Court declared unconstitutional in Pollock v. Farmers’ Loan
& Tr. Co., 158 U.S. 601, 637 (1895). KAPLAN & RYLEY, supra note 88, at 8.
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of view . . . was even more complicated than its predecessors.” 159
Nevertheless, Congress did not significantly alter it for twelve
years, focusing its attention on other political and economic issues. 160
In the interim, President McKinley removed Ferdinand
Shurtleff from his office as a member of the Board on May 3, 1899,
though the process began a few months earlier in January 1899. 161
The demand for Shurtleff’s resignation appeared to stem from two
factors: disputes about proper application of the tariff statutes and
the Board’s unusual place in the Treasury Department’s administrative structure. A letter dated January 6, 1899, from the President of the Board of General Appraisers, George Tichenor, to Garret Hobart, McKinley’s Vice President until his death later in 1899,
illustrated the first factor. 162 Tichenor’s letter conveyed his “earnest suggestion that [the President] select the very best man possible to . . . assur[e] to the public that in the contemplated reorganization of the Board . . . a radical improvement in the Personnel is
contemplated”; to “strengthen[] the Board both in capacity and reputation”; and “[to] discourage weak, incompetent and improper
persons from seeking and being recommended for appointment to
the Board.” 163 In this regard, Tichenor remarked that “President
[Benjamin] Harrison was most unfortunate in selection [of] so
many members who were markedly lacking” in the necessary
“qualities and requirements.” 164 But while these aspects of
Tichenor’s letter sounded in straightforward themes of good governance, other parts of the letter indicated the existence of fundamental policy disputes. As Tichenor put it, “[n]ot more than three
of the nine members selected by” Harrison were “protectionists or
159. ASHLEY, supra note 95, at 221.
160. Id. at 230.
161. Shurtleff v. United States, 189 U.S. 311, 312 (1903); Transcript of Record at 1–2,
Shurtleff, 189 U.S. 311 (No. 620).
162. Letter from George C. Tichenor, President of the Bd. of Gen. Appraisers, to Garret
Hobart, Vice President of the U.S. (Jan. 6, 1899), microformed on William McKinley Papers,
reel 5 (Library of Cong.).
163. Id. (emphasis omitted).
164. Id. Tichenor’s letter to Hobart did not mention Shurtleff expressly, but rather was
prompted by the anticipated resignation of George Sharpe, whom Tichenor described in
scathing terms. See id. (“It would be a weak man indeed who would not be an improvement
upon General Sharpe in point of efficiency . . . . [His] tenure should not be dependent upon
the selection of his successor, but should terminate at once, as his services are of but little
consequence.”); see also Letter from George M. Sharpe, Member of the Bd. of Gen. Appraisers, to William McKinley, President of the U.S. (Jan. 18, 1899), microformed on William
McKinley Papers, reel 5 (Library of Cong.) (tendering resignation from the Board).
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in sympathy with the real purposes of the Customs Administrative
Act and of the tariff system and policy which the Administrative
Act was intended to safe guard.” 165 The “remaining members,” according to Tichenor, were “either free traders, so-called revenue reformers, or worse than all men without conviction.” 166 McKinley’s
appointment, by contrast, should be “above all a protectionist of
mature conviction and in full sympathy with our tariff system.” 167
The second possible rationale for Shurtleff’s removal—the
Board’s unusual place in the Treasury Department’s administrative structure—was hinted at in newspaper reports that followed
the January 17, 1899, letter that McKinley’s Secretary of the
Treasury, Lyman Gage, sent to Shurtleff requesting his resignation. 168 One news report identified “friction between the Appraisers
and the Treasury department,” because Board members “contend[ed] they were not responsible to the Secretary of the Treasury.” 169 In this regard, the Secretary of the Treasury had enacted
regulations in 1897 “materially curtailing the powers of the Appraisers and brushing away the contention that they possessed judicial functions”—thereby “widen[ing]” the “breach” between the
two bodies. 170
Shurtleff’s reaction to the request for his resignation was “surprise.” 171 As he put it, he had “always thought that the tenure of
office of the general appraiser was for life,” that his “efficiency” had
not been “questioned,” and that no charges could be brought “[a]s
to neglect of duty or malfeasance in office.” 172
Notwithstanding this complex backdrop, when McKinley finally
removed Shurtleff, his letter was short and to the point: “You are

165. Letter from George C. Tichenor, President of the Bd. of Gen. Appraisers, to Garret
Hobart, Vice President of the U.S. (Jan. 6, 1899), microformed on William McKinley Papers,
reel 5 (Library of Cong.).
166. Id.
167. Id. Tichenor claimed that, because of these deficiencies in the Board’s personnel,
his “health ha[d] been destroyed in almost super-human efforts to save the Administrative
Act from public condemnation, notwithstanding the fact that it [was] the very best system
of Customs administration ever devised in any country.” Id.
168. President Asks Appraisers to Resign, supra note 156, at 1. In addition to Shurtleff,
McKinley asked for the resignation of a second member of the Board, Joseph Biddle Wilkinson. See id.
169. Id.
170. Id.
171. Mr. Shurtleff Surprised, WASH. POST, Jan. 25, 1899, at 9.
172. Id.
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hereby removed from the office of general appraiser of merchandise, to take effect upon the appointment and qualification of your
successor.” 173 Most pertinently, the letter did not specify any reasons for Shurtleff’s removal. Nine days later (on May 12, 1899),
McKinley made a recess appointment to fill Shurtleff’s position and
on May 15, 1899, Shurtleff stopped receiving his salary from the
Treasury Department. 174 The Senate later confirmed Shurtleff’s
replacement on January 17, 1900. 175
McKinley’s removal of Shurtleff was something of a cause célèbre in financial circles. According to an article in the New York
Times, it “was reported that Mr. Shurtleff had secured the services
of ex-President Benjamin Harrison as counsel” for a potential lawsuit seeking backpay. 176 While that rumor turned out to be untrue,
Shurtleff was ultimately able to retain John G. Carlisle, a former
Secretary of the Treasury. 177 The political salience of the lawsuit
was further demonstrated by reports suggesting that a “number of
importers in New York ha[d] interested themselves” in it, “collected funds for defraying [Shurtleff’s] expenses,” 178 and adopted
resolutions “protesting against President McKinley’s action in
summarily removing Mr. Shurtleff.” 179
Shurtleff sued to recover his salary in the Court of Claims, which
rejected his argument. 180 He then sought review in the Supreme
Court, which also rejected his argument. 181 The Supreme Court
reasoned that Congress’s enumeration of the bases on which the
President could remove a general appraiser—“inefficiency, neglect
of duty, or malfeasance in office”—did not exhaust the possible
grounds for the President’s exercise of his removal authority. 182
173. Shurtleff v. United States, 189 U.S. 311, 312 (1903).
174. Id. at 312–13; see Israel F. Fischer Sworn In, N.Y. TIMES, May 16, 1899, at 12.
175. Shurtleff, 189 U.S. at 313.
176. He May Retain Gen. Harrison, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 10, 1899, at 5.
177. Mr. Shurtleff May Contest, N.Y. TIMES, May 26, 1899, at 2; Mr. Shurtleff to Sue the
Government, N.Y. TIMES, June 21, 1899, at 5.
178. Mr. Shurtleff to Sue the Government, supra note 177, at 2.
179. Mr. Shurtleff May Contest, supra note 177, at 2.
180. Shurtleff, 189 U.S. at 311; see Mr. Shurtleff Brings Suit, N.Y. TIMES, June 28, 1899,
at 14.
181. Shurtleff, 189 U.S. at 318–19. Justice Joseph McKenna was a member of the
Shurtleff Court, having previously played a role as a Representative in the 1890 congressional debate over the creation of the Board. See id. at 313; 21 CONG. REC. 833 (1890) (statement of Rep. McKenna).
182. Id. at 313, 319; see also id. at 317 (rejecting as “mistaken” the proposition that “the
mere specification in the statute of some causes for removal thereby excluded the right of
the President to remove for any other reason which he, acting with a due sense of his official
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The background rule, according to the Court, was that, “in the absence of constitutional or statutory provision the President can by
virtue of his general power of appointment remove an officer.” 183 It
would take “very clear and explicit language,” rather than “mere
inference or implications,” to displace this background rule. 184 Section 12 of the Customs Administrative Act, the Court concluded,
did not contain such a clear statement. 185 Moreover, the Court
noted, if Section 12 were interpreted to contain an exclusive list of
bases for removal, the consequences would be dramatic, for it
would “give an appraiser of merchandise the right to hold that office during his life or until he shall be found guilty of some act specified in the statute.” 186 That would accomplish “a complete revolution in the general tenure of office”—an “extraordinary change”
that the Court believed could not be attributed to Congress. 187
Thus, where the President elected to remove an officer for a
cause not specified by statute, he could do so for any reason and in
any manner that he chose. 188 The statute simply required that the
officer be given notice and a hearing when the President invoked
one of the three enumerated grounds. 189

responsibility, should think sufficient”).
183. Id. at 314–15; see Parsons v. United States, 167 U.S. 324, 343 (1897); Ex parte Hennen, 38 U.S. (13 Pet.) 230, 259 (1839).
184. Shurtleff, 189 U.S. at 315; see, e.g., Blake v. United States, 103 U.S. 227, 236 (1880).
The Shurtleff Court drew a distinction between inferior officers appointed by principal officers and those who had been appointed by the President. Shurtleff, 189 U.S. at 315. In
Shurtleff, the Court said: “Congress has regarded the office as of sufficient importance to
make it proper to fill it by an appointment to be made by the President and confirmed by
the Senate. It has thereby classed it as appropriately coming under the direct supervision
of the President . . . .” Id.
185. Shurtleff, 189 U.S. at 315–16 (rejecting application of the “expressio unius est exclusio alterius” canon and the argument that “the President was . . . prohibited from any removal excepting for the causes, or some of them” enumerated in the statute).
186. Id. at 316.
187. Id. (reasoning that the contrary interpretation “would involve the alteration of the
universal practice of the government for over a century and the consequent curtailment of
the powers of the executive in such an unusual manner”).
188. Id. at 318–19. The Court assumed
for the purposes of this case only, that Congress could attach such conditions
to the removal of an officer appointed under this statute as to it might seem
proper, and, therefore, that it could provide that the officer should only be removed for the causes stated and for no other, and after notice and an opportunity for a hearing.
Id. at 314. As discussed immediately below, Congress took the invitation to change the statute five years later. See infra Part I.C.3.
189. Shurtleff, 189 U.S. at 314, 317 (“[I]f a removal is made without such notice, there is
a conclusive presumption that the officer was not removed for any of those causes, and his
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3. Congress’s Amendment to the Removal Restriction
Five years after the decision in Shurtleff, Congress amended the
Customs Administrative Act with the Act of May 27, 1908 (“1908
Act”) to provide “[t]hat all of the general appraisers of merchandise
heretofore or hereafter appointed . . . [could] after due hearing, be
removed by the President for the following causes, and no other:
Neglect of duty, malfeasance in office, or inefficiency.” 190 The addition of the “and no other” language was clearly targeted at the
Court’s interpretation of the removal restriction in Shurtleff.
When the provision was debated in Congress, Representative
Sereno Payne—the bill’s principal sponsor—clarified that this provision was intended to make “it impossible to remove an appraiser
except upon charges and an opportunity to be heard.” 191 According
to Payne:
It was realized in the very beginning, at the passage of this law, that
in order to insure efficiency by this Board the members of it should
not be subject to removal at the mere whim or caprice of the President
or anybody else. They are appointed from both political parties, a certain number from one party, and they should hold office during good
behavier [sic]. This is what was intended to be provided for in the law
as it now exists, that the President should not remove them except
upon charges and for cause, but the President did remove one several
years ago and it went to the Supreme Court and the Supreme Court
decided that the President could remove them at pleasure. Now, this
bill provides, if I can turn my eye to the particular paragraph, that
they can only be removed by the President, not for political reasons,
but after due inquiry, for reasons of neglect of duty, incompetency, or
malfeasance in office. It is very important, the Government being one
of the litigants on one side, that these men should be kept entirely
independent of the Administration so that they may be able to perform
their duties fearlessly and honestly. 192

On further questioning by Representative John Gaines of Tennessee, Payne declared that the appraisers were “put in the same

removal cannot be regarded as the least imputation on his character for integrity or capacity.”); see also Reagan v. United States, 182 U.S. 419, 425 (1901) (holding that, if a statute
specifies causes for removal, “then the rule would apply that where causes of removal are
specified by constitution or statute, as also where the term of office is for a fixed period,
notice and hearing are essential”). Shurtleff also relied on a series of state cases to establish
this proposition. See Shurtleff, 189 U.S. at 314.
190. Act of May 27, 1908, Pub. L. No. 60-146, sec. 3, § 31, 35 Stat. 403, 406 (emphasis
added).
191. 42 CONG. REC. 5036 (1908) (statement of Rep. Payne).
192. Id. (statement of Rep. Payne).
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category as the judges who have these questions to determine.” 193
He also claimed that the kind of hearing was “for the President to
decide,” so long as it was “a hearing upon inquiry and with opportunity for them to be heard.” 194 In a similar vein, in response to
questions from Senator Augustus Bacon of Georgia, the bill’s chief
Senate sponsor, Senator Nelson Aldrich of Rhode Island, argued
that the statute rendered an appraiser a holder of office “during
good behavior, but he is removable for certain causes”—a state of
affairs that had “not been the case heretofore” because “[t]hese officers ha[d] been removable at the pleasure of the President for political or other reasons.” 195
The 1908 Act also included a number of provisions making the
Board more “court-like.” Most pertinently, the 1908 Act required
challengers to exhaust their evidence with the Board before taking
an appeal to federal court. 196 In addition, it provided that the
193. Id. (statement of Rep. Payne).
194. Id. (statement of Rep. Payne). The accompanying House Report expressed the same
basic logic:
[The bill] fixes the tenure of office of the general appraisers by providing for
removal only for cause and after due inquiry. The original law was intended to
provide just this; but it has since been held by the Supreme Court that a general appraiser may be removed at the will of the President. It is urged by the
importers that this takes away, to a certain extent, the independence of the
general appraisers and tends to make them subservient to one of the parties
litigant before them, to wit, the United States.
This amendment is recommended for the influence it may have in constituting this tribunal as it was intended to be, an entirely independent tribunal, not
removable for political reasons or, in fact, for any reasons save those mentioned
and then only after due inquiry.
The peculiar nature of the duties of the general appraisers is such that the
more expert they become in the examination and passing upon the questions
brought before them the more serviceable they are in the administration of the
law.
It may also be said that, after abandoning their professions or life work to
engage in the service of a general appraiser, they soon become unfitted to undertake any other occupation, and if removed for political reasons, are thrown
out at a time of life when it is difficult to engage in anything which will be
profitable or lucrative.
H.R. REP. NO. 60-1450, at 5 (1908).
195. 42 CONG. REC. 6188–89 (1908) (statement of Sen. Aldrich).
196. Act of May 27, 1908, Pub. L. No. 60-146, sec. 2, § 15, 35 Stat. 403, 404; 42 CONG.
REC. 6915 (1908) (statements of Rep. Payne and Rep. Underwood); 42 CONG. REC. 5036
(1908) (statement of Rep. Payne) (“The custom now is, I might say, almost general for the
importer to call a single witness, not to make out his case, and leave the general appraisers
to decide against him, and then take the appeal to the circuit court, where the case may be
heard on new evidence.”); 42 CONG. REC. 5036 (1908) (statement of Rep. Underwood) (“[I]f
the importer did not wish to risk his case and merely wanted to develop the Government’s
side of the case, he allowed the Government to develop its evidence, closed the case, and
took an appeal to the district court of the United States, where the question was open de
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Board’s decision “as to the rate and amount of duties chargeable
upon imported merchandise . . . and as to all fees and exactions of
whatever character (except duties on tonnage), shall be final and
conclusive upon all persons interested” unless the decision was appealed to the circuit court. 197 The 1908 Act also granted the Board
of nine general appraisers the power to establish “such reasonable
rules of practice . . . as may be deemed necessary for the conduct of
their proceedings.” 198 Finally, the 1908 Act gave the Board “all the
powers of a circuit court of the United States in preserving order,
compelling the attendance of witnesses, and the production of evidence, and in punishing for contempt.” 199
The effect of the 1908 Act was to negate the construction that
Shurtleff had given to the provision restricting the President’s removal authority. If a President wanted to remove a member of the
Board after 1908, he would have to satisfy the 1908 Act’s protections—or argue that they were unconstitutional. In the background of this debate was a certain Senator George Sutherland.
Although he appears not to have played a role in the debate, he
later wrote the Court’s opinion in Humphrey’s Executor, which distinguished the Court’s earlier opinion in Shurtleff. 200
II. THE EVENTS OF 1912 AND 1913
Between the Civil War and Taft’s presidency, the Republican
Party had supported a high tariff to protect American industry,
which had led to the association of high tariffs with big business
(and, to be sure, the workers of those businesses). 201 Opponents believed the tariff was little more than a subsidy for big business—
“the mother of the trusts” 202—that led to a higher cost of living for
the general population. 203 The Dingley tariff (“Dingley Bill of
novo, and he had a chance to develop his case entirely again . . . .”).
197. Act of May 27, 1908 sec. 1, § 14, 35 Stat. at 403–04.
198. Id. sec. 1, § 14, 35 Stat. at 404.
199. Id. sec. 3, § 31, 35 Stat. at 406.
200. Humphrey’s Ex’r v. United States, 295 U.S. 602, 618, 621–23 (1935).
201. See KAPLAN & RYLEY, supra note 88, at 1.
202. See CHARLES A. BEARD, CONTEMPORARY AMERICAN HISTORY, 1877–1913, at 112–13
(1914) (“[T]he favorite [Democratic] party slogan [was] that ‘the tariff is the mother of the
trusts.’”).
203. Id. at 1; see ASHLEY, supra note 95, at 237; KAPLAN & RYLEY, supra note 88, at 4;
JOANNE REITANO, THE TARIFF QUESTION IN THE GILDED AGE 74 (1994) (noting that Republicans used the tariff to concentrate wealth in big businesses, giving a trickle-down effect to
big business’s employees); Always Arrayed Against Business. Whenever the Free-Trade Party
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1897”) had raised the tariff to an all-time high. 204 As for tariff administration, the enactment of the Customs Administrative Act’s
tariff provisions made the Board a major component. When Taft
came to power, the stage was set for major changes.
A. Taft and Frankfurter Go to Washington
Taft ascended to the White House with one of the most glittering
resumes imaginable. He had been a judge on the Sixth Circuit
Court of Appeals, the first Governor-General of the Philippines,
and the Secretary of War under President Theodore Roosevelt. 205
Among his tasks in the latter capacity was the building of the Panama Canal—no small legal, diplomatic, or technical achievement. 206 Both the tariff and presidential control of the executive
branch played important roles in Taft’s presidency.
Although a Republican—and nowadays, generally associated
with the party’s relatively conservative wing, which tended toward
protectionism—Taft was on record as desiring a downward revision of the tariff under the Dingley Bill of 1897. 207 The tariff had
played an important role in Taft’s election. 208 The Democratic
Party “pronounced in favour of an effective and extensive reduction
of the rates of duty.” 209 The Republicans also sought tariff revision,
but were splintered—with one faction in favor of real reduction in
the protective rates, while another and more powerful faction
sought “a revision of the tariff by its friends.” 210 During the 1908
presidential campaign, Taft had expressed the view that “a revision of the tariff in accordance with the pledge of the Republican
platform will be, on the whole, a substantial revision downward.” 211
Has Been in Power American Business Has Suffered., 55 AM. ECONOMIST 176, 176 (1915)
(linking the protective tariff of the Republican Party to the protection of big business).
204. KAPLAN & RYLEY, supra note 88, at 11–12.
205. DONALD F. ANDERSON, supra note 10, at 6–7, 11–12.
206. Id. at 17–18.
207. KAPLAN & RYLEY, supra note 88, at 39.
208. ASHLEY, supra note 95, at 237.
209. Id.
210. Id. at 238; see G.M. Fisk, The Payne-Aldrich Tariff, 25 POL. SCI. Q. 35, 37 (1910);
F.W. Taussig, The Tariff Debate of 1909 and the New Tariff Act, 24 Q.J. ECON. 1, 17 (1909);
H. Parker Willis, The Tariff of 1909, 17 J. POL. ECON. 589, 589 (1909).
211. Fisk, supra note 210, at 38–39 (quoting President Taft from his campaign speech in
Milwaukee on September 24, 1908); see JUDITH ICKE ANDERSON, WILLIAM HOWARD TAFT:
AN INTIMATE HISTORY 170 (1981) (“Taft had pledged himself squarely to a revision that
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The tariff thus became one of the major political issues of Taft’s
presidency. Upon election, Taft called a special congressional session to consider the tariff. 212 But he did not specify what he expected from a tariff bill—not even by announcing whether he expected rate reductions—leaving those details to be hashed out in
Congress. 213 A bill proposed by Congressman Sereno Payne passed
the House, enlarging a list of commodities that could enter the
country duty free and cutting duties on certain other products. 214
In the Senate, however, old-guard Republicans led by Aldrich
sought to revise the rates upward. 215 The final bill (“Payne-Aldrich
Bill”), which Taft signed, did not amount to a dramatic downward
revision of rates. 216 Indeed, it increased some duties. 217
The congressional election of 1910—in which the Republicans
lost their large majority—was widely attributed to Taft’s handling
of the tariff issue. 218 Many moderate Republicans were dissatisfied
with the tariff bill because they sought a true downward revision
of duties. 219 The Democrats, having taken the House in the election
of 1910, quickly enacted bills to reduce substantially the duties on
certain goods, some of which passed the Senate with modifications—only to be vetoed by Taft. 220
Taft’s removal of subordinates also played an important role in
his presidency. Taft may have been “skeptical” of some aspects of
would benefit the consumer.” (quoting Tariff Put Up to Taft, WASH. POST, Apr. 28, 1909, at
6)). For a treatment of the Payne-Aldrich Tariff Bill, see JUDITH ICKE ANDERSON, supra, at
169–79. For a suggestion that the Republican platform was not as anti-tariff as Taft’s statement, see DONALD F. ANDERSON, supra note 10, at 38, 52 (noting that “Taft pushed more
aggressively than Roosevelt for downward revision, and during his campaign he pledged to
call a special session of Congress to dispose of the issue”).
212. 44 CONG. REC. 49 (1909); KAPLAN & RYLEY, supra note 88, at 40. The message, however, studiously avoided referring to a downward revision of rates. KAPLAN & RYLEY, supra
note 88, at 40.
213. KAPLAN & RYLEY, supra note 88, at 40.
214. Id.
215. Id. at 41. The machinations in the Senate formed the basis for the modern income
and corporate taxes. With Taft’s support, Senator William Borah, a progressive Republican
from Idaho, introduced an income tax amendment to the Payne-Aldrich Bill, notwithstanding the Supreme Court’s earlier determination in Pollock v. Farmers’ Loan & Trust Co. that
the tax was unconstitutional. Id. at 42. Although the income tax was not a part of the final
bill, Aldrich agreed to a tax on corporations and agreed to permit the states to vote on an
income tax amendment to the Constitution. Id.
216. See ASHLEY, supra note 95, at 243, 252. Taft had, by and large, refrained from any
direct intervention in negotiations until the conference of the two bills. Id. at 243.
217. See id. at 240, 242, 244–46.
218. KAPLAN & RYLEY, supra note 88, at 43–44.
219. See ASHLEY, supra note 95, at 250.
220. Id. at 253.
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the robust vision of executive authority advanced by his predecessor, Theodore Roosevelt, 221 but presidential authority to remove
subordinates was not one of them. In 1910, his removal of the federal Chief Forester, Gifford Pinchot, caused a rupture with Roosevelt. 222 The disagreement between the two prompted Roosevelt’s
candidacy as a “Bull Moose” in the 1912 election, which split the
Republican vote and contributed to Taft’s defeat and Woodrow Wilson’s victory in the campaign for the Presidency. 223
Frankfurter, on the other hand, had followed his mentor, Henry
Stimson, to Washington. Taft appointed Stimson, a former United
States Attorney for the Southern District of New York, Secretary
of War in 1910, and Stimson, in turn, appointed his former aide,
Felix Frankfurter, as the law officer of the Bureau of Insular Affairs. 224 A twenty-eight-year-old at the time of his appointment in
1911, Frankfurter served as a personal assistant to Stimson, helping with speeches, sitting in on department conferences, and offering advice. 225
B. Taft’s Decision to Remove
There were a variety of issues to occupy Taft’s mind in the final
days of 1912—what were to be the final days of his presidency. For
example, in August 1912, Congress passed the Panama Canal Act,
providing for the administration of the canal zone and authorizing
the President to fix, within limits, the tolls to be paid by vessels
using the canal. 226 Nevertheless, Taft spent an inordinate amount
of effort on the removal of two general appraisers.
On August 21, 1912, Taft wrote Chandler Anderson (the Counselor for the State Department), Winfred Denison (an Assistant Attorney General in the Department of Justice), and William Loeb,
Jr., (the Collector of Customs for the Port of New York), appointing

221. See, e.g., STEPHEN SKOWRONEK, BUILDING A NEW AMERICAN STATE: THE EXPANSION
OF NATIONAL ADMINISTRATIVE CAPACITIES, 1877–1920, at 173 (1982).
222.
223.
224.
225.
226.

See CHACE, supra note 1, at 14.
See id. at 14–19, 117, 209.
BAKER, supra note 10, at 13–15, 30.
Id. at 30.
ASHLEY, supra note 95, at 256.
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them to “a committee of inquiry to investigate the practice, procedure and administrative methods of the Board.” 227 The letters instructed them to “conduct [the] investigation with the view to obtaining increased efficiency and greater economy in the
expenditure of public money . . . and . . . obtaining better administrative methods” for the Board. 228 It also directed them to report
whether “there has been, within the meaning of the . . . Statute,
any neglect of duty, malfeasance in office, or inefficiency on the
part of any members of the said Board.” 229
Newspapers carried the Treasury Department’s announcement
of the initiation of an investigation. One report described the investigation as the “result of complaints that the work of the board
does not give satisfactory results as a portion of the governmental
mechanism of collecting revenues from customs.” 230 On August 27,
1912, one of the Board’s members—Thaddeus Sharretts—fired a
volley in the other direction by issuing a counter-statement to the
press. According to him, the Board “had a very different idea of its
function” than the Treasury Department’s statement would have
suggested. 231 For one thing, Sharretts believed, the Board “received the powers of a court by act of Congress,” with “the same
authority as any other Federal tribunal to subpoena witnesses and
to punish for contempt.” 232 In doing so, according to Sharretts, the

227. Taft sent three separate letters, identical in material respects, to the anticipated
members of the Committee. Letter from William H. Taft, President of the U.S., to Winfred
T. Denison, Assistant Attorney Gen. of the U.S., U.S. Dep’t of Justice (Aug. 21, 1912), microformed on William H. Taft Papers, reel 513 (Library of Cong.) [hereinafter Taft Papers];
Letter from William H. Taft, President of the U.S., to William Loeb, Jr., Collector of Customs, Port of N.Y. (Aug. 21, 1912), microformed on Taft Papers, reel 513; Letter from William H. Taft, President of the U.S., to Chandler P. Anderson, Counselor for the U.S. State
Dep’t (Aug. 21, 1912), microformed on Taft Papers, reel 513.
228. Letter from William H. Taft, President of the U.S., to Winfred T. Denison, Assistant
Attorney Gen. of the U.S., U.S. Dep’t of Justice (Aug. 21, 1912), microformed on Taft Papers,
reel 513; Letter from William H. Taft, President of the U.S., to William Loeb, Jr., Collector
of Customs, Port of N.Y. (Aug. 21, 1912), microformed on Taft Papers, reel 513; Letter from
William H. Taft, President of the U.S., to Chandler P. Anderson, Counselor for the U.S.
State Dep’t (Aug. 21, 1912), microformed on Taft Papers, reel 513.
229. Letter from William H. Taft, President of the U.S., to Winfred T. Denison, Assistant
Attorney Gen. of the U.S., U.S. Dep’t of Justice (Aug. 21, 1912), microformed on Taft Papers,
reel 513; Letter from William H. Taft, President of the U.S., to William Loeb, Jr., Collector
of Customs, Port of N.Y. (Aug. 21, 1912), microformed on Taft Papers, reel 513; Letter from
William H. Taft, President of the U.S., to Chandler P. Anderson, Counselor for the U.S.
State Dep’t (Aug. 21, 1912), microformed on Taft Papers, reel 513.
230. Customs Appraisers to Be Investigated, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 22, 1912, at 18.
231. Appraisers Resent Being Investigated, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 27, 1912, at 12.
232. Id.
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appraisers “act as Judges” with “judicial powers” by “tak[ing] testimony and render[ing] decisions in accordance with the evidence
before them.” 233 For another, the Board’s function, Sharretts contended, “[was] to do justice between importers and the customs.” 234
The Board was not a part of the “mechanism of collecting revenue,”
because there were “two dissatisfied parties every time the board
overthrew a customs ruling and admitted an imported article at a
lower rate of duty”—the Treasury Department and the American
manufacturer of competing goods. 235
“So far as an investigation goes,” Sharretts confidently predicted, “I am sure that I have been guilty of no malfeasance in office
or inefficiency.” 236
On September 30, 1912, Anderson withdrew due to the pressure
of his obligations as Counselor for the Department of State. 237 Anderson’s departure made space for the then-comparatively-obscure
Frankfurter, who was appointed to replace him. 238 Together, Denison, Loeb, and Frankfurter constituted the President’s “committee
of inquiry” (“Committee”). 239
While the Committee conducted its work, Taft received reports
about Sharretts. In a September 28, 1912 letter, Senator Frank
Briggs of New Jersey wrote Taft directly to request that he intervene in the assignment of certain appraisals (related to pottery) to
a subset of the Board that included Sharretts. Briggs requested
that Taft “take steps which will secure a fair hearing of the case,
which cannot be had before [the subset of the Board], as Mr. Sharretts’ attitude is already well known in all pottery matters.” 240 Two
days later, Taft dispatched three letters. First, he wrote Franklin

233. Id.
234. Id.
235. Id.
236. Id.
237. Letter from Chandler P. Anderson, Counselor for the U.S. State Dep’t, to William
H. Taft, President of the U.S. (Sept. 30, 1912), microformed on Taft Papers, reel 361.
238. Letter from William H. Taft, President of the U.S., to Felix Frankfurter, Esquire,
Bureau of Insular Affairs, U.S. War Dep’t (Oct. 17, 1912), microformed on Taft Papers, reel
515; Letter from Franklin MacVeagh, Sec’y of the U.S. Treasury, to Rudolph Forster (Oct.
12, 1912), microformed on Taft Papers, reel 361.
239. Letter from William H. Taft, President of the U.S., to Felix Frankfurter, Esquire,
Bureau of Insular Affairs, U.S. War Dep’t (Oct. 17, 1912), microformed on Taft Papers, reel
514.
240. Letter from Frank O. Briggs, Senator from N.J., to William H. Taft, President of
the U.S. (Sept. 28, 1912), microformed on Taft Papers, reel 447.
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MacVeagh, his Secretary of the Treasury, that he had heard Sharretts had taken “an unjudicial attitude, made rulings, and reached
a conclusion not justified by the evidence” in pottery-related matters. 241 In his letter, Taft remarked that he was aware that he could
“remove for cause, and I am not sure that I cannot remove without
cause, general appraisers, but I don’t want to do it without full consideration and full deliberation.” 242 Second, he wrote his Attorney
General, George Wickersham, conveying substantially the same
sentiments, both with respect to Sharretts, and with respect to his
own authority to remove members of the Board. 243 Third, without
waiting for a response from either MacVeagh or Wickersham, Taft
wrote Henderson M. Somerville, the President of the Board, advising him that “[r]epresentations have been made to me in reference
to the judicial fitness and qualification of Mr. Sharretts to sit in a
case involving the appraisement of certain porcelains”—with “intimations” that were “sufficiently serious to justify a continuance of
this case until I can confer with you, the Attorney General and the
Secretary of the Treasury.” 244
In short order, Taft began to hear from Sharretts’s supporters,
who appeared to sense that Taft had him in the crosshairs. On October 11, 1912, Senator Winthrop “Murray” Crane wrote Taft that
he had “learn[ed] that there is some opposition” to Sharretts, but
that Sharretts had been “most helpful to the Finance Committee
during the consideration of the Payne-Aldrich Bill.” 245 On October
241. Letter from William H. Taft, President of the U.S., to Franklin MacVeagh, Sec’y of
the U.S. Treasury (Sept. 30, 1912), microformed on Taft Papers, reel 514.
242. Id.
243. Letter from William H. Taft, President of the U.S., to George Wickersham, Attorney
Gen. of the U.S., U.S. Dep’t of Justice (Sept. 30, 1912), microformed on Taft Papers, reel
514. On October 3, 1912, Wickersham responded that he had “referred” Sharretts’s case to
the committee, but that “on the face of it, I could not quite see that there was enough to
justify your exercising the power of removal.” Letter from George Wickersham, Attorney
Gen. of the U.S., U.S. Dep’t of Justice, to William H. Taft, President of the U.S. (Oct. 3,
1912), microformed on Taft Papers, reel 361.
244. Telegram from William H. Taft, President of the U.S., to Henderson M. Somerville,
President of the Bd. of Gen. Appraisers (Sept. 30, 1912), microformed on Taft Papers, reel
361. Taft “submit[ted] the matter to [Somerville’s] discretion whether a continuance ought
not to be had.” Id.; see also Letter from Franklin MacVeagh, Sec’y of the U.S. Treasury, to
Rudolph Forster (Oct. 24, 1912), microformed on Taft Papers, reel 447. On October 2, 1912,
Somerville responded to the President that the case had been “heard and submitted before
receipt” of the President’s letter, but that the “decision of the case has been postponed to
November twentieth.” Telegram from Henderson M. Somerville, President of the Bd. of Gen.
Appraisers, to William H. Taft, President of the U.S. (Oct. 2, 1912), microformed on Taft
Papers, reel 361.
245. Letter from Winthrop M. Crane, U.S. Senator from Mass., to William H. Taft, President of the U.S. (Oct. 11, 1912), microformed on Taft Papers, reel 361. Taft responded to
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12, 1912, Taft heard from Senator Henry Cabot Lodge, who said
that he was “astonished at the mere suggestion” that Sharretts
might be removed. 246 Lodge described Sharretts as “the best tariff
expert in the country,” who could not be approached “in extensiveness, minuteness, and accuracy of knowledge” and who had “been
called in by both parties whenever a general tariff revision was undertaken by Congress.” 247 Lodge remarked that Sharretts was a
“Democrat in politics, so that I have no party prejudice in what I
say,” but that he did “not believe that a greater injury could be done
to the Customs Service than to remove Judge Sharretts from the
Board.” 248 On November 4, 1912, Senator Nelson Aldrich wrote
Taft that he knew “nothing of the nature of the charges” against
Sharretts, but that he “would be very glad to have a talk with you
with reference to Mr. Sharretts.” 249
But Taft could not be swayed. The Committee proceeded, conducting a broad-ranging investigation and meeting with the members of the Board and “a large number of other persons.” 250 On January 31, 1913—after Taft had already lost the presidency in the
election of 1912—the Committee held a public hearing on Sharretts’s conduct. 251 One news report observed that “[f]or the first
time since the organization in 1890 of the Board of United States
General Appraisers, a member of the Customs tribunal appeared . . . to answer the charge of malfeasance in office.” 252
On February 15, 1913, the Committee issued a report on the
“Procedure, Practice, Administrative Methods of the Board of

Crane one week later to say: “The board of general appraisers is not doing well, and . . . .
[t]here are circumstances upon which suspicion of Sharretts is based, but I shall have a
thorough and impartial investigation made and I hope it will do no man an injustice.” Letter
from William H. Taft, President of the U.S., to Winthrop M. Crane, U.S. Senator from Mass.
(Oct. 17, 1912), microformed on Taft Papers, reel 514.
246. Letter from Henry Cabot Lodge, U.S. Senator from Mass., to William H. Taft, President of the U.S. (Oct. 12, 1912), microformed on Taft Papers, reel 361.
247. Id.
248. Id. On the same day he wrote Crane, Taft wrote Lodge a letter with the same material points. Letter from William H. Taft, President of the U.S., to Henry Cabot Lodge, U.S.
Senator from Mass. (Oct. 17, 1912), microformed on Taft Papers, reel 514.
249. Letter from Nelson Aldrich, U.S. Senator from R.I., to William H. Taft, President of
the U.S. (Nov. 4, 1912), microformed on Taft Papers, reel 361.
250. PRESIDENT’S COMM. OF INQUIRY ON THE PROCEDURE, PRACTICE, ADMIN. METHODS
& PERSONNEL OF THE BD. OF U.S. GEN. APPRAISERS, SEPARATE REPORT ON THE PERSONNEL
2 (Feb. 15, 1913) [hereinafter REPORT], microformed on The Papers of Felix Frankfurter
(1983), reel 31 (Library of Cong).
251. U.S. Appraiser Under Fire, WASH. POST, Jan. 31, 1913, at 5.
252. Tried to Make Train Stop, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 1, 1913, at 10.
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United States General Appraisers.” 253 On the same date, the Committee also issued a “Separate Report on the Personnel,” (“Report”) 254 which addressed “whether or not there ha[d] been within
the meaning of the [statutory removal restriction] any neglect of
duty, malfeasance in office, or inefficiency on the part of any member of the said Board.” 255
The Report recommended that the President remove Sharretts,
as well as a second appraiser, Roy Chamberlain, for both “neglect
of duty” and “malfeasance in office.” 256 For Sharretts, the Report
gave two reasons in two separate “specifications.” 257 First, the Report charged Sharretts with using “his official power to compel personal favors,” in particular from the Baltimore and Ohio Railroad
Company. 258 To substantiate the charge, the Report cited a letter
in which Sharretts had requested that a particular train leaving
Chicago “stop on Sundays at Bradshaw when flagged to take on
passengers for New York.” 259 In the letter, Sharretts had said that
the train had stopped there for several years to “accommodate”
him, because it was “largely through [his] influence” that various
shippers used the Baltimore and Ohio Railroad Company to
transport merchandise. 260 Sharretts noted that “unfortunate dock
strikes” had compelled the shippers to divert their wares, but “after conditions become settled, [he was] convinced [he could] again
induce the firms to return.” 261 The letter, thus, appeared to suggest
a quid pro quo in which a train would stop at a particular point in

253. PRESIDENT’S COMM. OF INQUIRY, REPORT OF THE COMMITTEE TO INQUIRE INTO THE
PROCEDURE, PRACTICE, AND ADMINISTRATIVE METHODS OF THE BOARD OF UNITED STATES
GENERAL APPRAISERS, S. DOC. NO. 63-7, at 2 (1913).
254. I reviewed a copy of this separate report, which was included in the papers of Felix
Frankfurter at the Library of Congress. See REPORT, supra note 250. What exactly the report—an internal government document that Frankfurter had marked “confidential”—was
doing there is something of a mystery.
255. Id. at 1. The Committee recommended that Somerville be asked to retire as Board
President and that the President transfer the “Chief Clerk” of the Board to some other position. Id. at 1–2, 17. With respect to the former, the Report contended that a change should
be made to take “the complicated and difficult administration of [the Board’s] affairs” out of
the hands of Somerville, who was (the Report claimed) “no longer able to perform the duties
of the presidency” due to “age and illness.” Id. at 2–3.
256. Id. at 1–2. The Report also recommended that a third general appraiser—Samuel
B. Cooper—not be removed. See id. at 15–17.
257. Id. at 4–10.
258. Id. at 4.
259. Id.
260. Id.
261. Id.
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exchange for “influence” with shippers to use the railroad. Sharretts responded with several defenses: that if he had influenced
importers, it was many years ago when he was an appraiser of a
local port with an incentive to boost that port’s traffic; that, at any
rate, the railroad had not granted his request; that there was no
impropriety in asking favors of importers; and that he had never
actually asked importers any other favors. 262 But he could not rebut the face of the letter, which suggested that he would use “influence” on the importers (even if he had not in fact done so). 263 The
Report thus contended that the letter was “the grossest impropriety and indicates an ethical standard totally unsuited to [Sharretts’s] official position.” 264
The second specification was that Sharretts had “greatly diminished the usefulness of the Board and impaired confidence in it
[by] . . . setting precedents for favorable decisions” in cases handled
by his son, who litigated before the Board. 265 According to the Report, although Sharretts had recused himself from his son’s cases,
he had “still controlled their decision by ruling” and setting “conclusive precedents” in other identical cases. 266 The Report suggested that the evidence that Sharretts knew he was influencing
his son’s cases was “circumstantial,” but removal was nevertheless
appropriate because it was “plainly incumbent upon the General
Appraiser to take affirmative steps to ascertain whether his son
ha[d] filed any identical protests.” 267 The Report also considered it
not “material that in some instances [Sharretts’s] rulings may have
been to some extent adverse to his son’s interest,” where they had
been “[i]n the main . . . favorable.” 268 The Report also observed that
nothing indicated that Sharretts “ha[d] been in any degree financially corrupt or that he ha[d] used his official position to further
his son’s practice (beyond the effect automatically resulting from
the condition) or that the son’s firm ha[d] used or attempted to use
any such pressure to obtain practice before the Board.” 269

262.
263.
264.
265.
266.
267.
268.
269.

Id. at 5.
See id. at 4–5.
Id. at 5.
Id. at 6.
Id. at 6–8.
Id. at 9.
Id.
Id. at 10.
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In terms of evidence, the Committee pointed to the “significan[ce]” of the fact that other members of the Board had advised
against the removal of another general appraiser, but that “none
of them ha[d] made any appeal on behalf of General Appraiser
Sharretts.” 270 “It seems,” the Report surmised, “that the other
members of the Board have been scandalized by the conditions surrounding the son’s practice before the Board and that they consider
it to have prejudiced the standing and usefulness of the Board.” 271
The Report also pointed to Sharretts’s “official methods,” which
(the Committee claimed) had created “controversy and doubt” “for
a great many years.” 272 Finally, the Report faulted Sharretts for
“actually drafting the various tariff bills which were subsequently
to come before him for construction, and affecting their policy,” rather than “merely serving as an impartial advisory expert to Committees of Congress.” 273
The Report’s analysis of the legal standard was sparse. The
Committee interpreted “malfeasance in office” to mean “misconduct,” “impropriety of conduct,” “maladministration,” or “misbehavior showing clear and flagrant disqualification and unfitness to
exercise the office.” 274 The Committee analogized this standard to
the “high crimes and misdemeanors” standard contained in the
Constitution, which it claimed “has been construed as having this
meaning.” 275
As for Chamberlain, the Committee concluded that he should be
removed for “incompetence,” because “his personal habits are such
as to destroy his usefulness as a member of the Board” and “he has
not the necessary qualifications for the performance of his duties.” 276 He was, in the Committee’s somewhat harsh language, “totally useless to the Board” because he was not a lawyer and lacked
a “natural aptitude for [the] kind of [classification] work” that the
Board conducted. 277 His opinions were “trifling in number and im-

270. Id.
271. Id.
272. Id. at 11.
273. Id.
274. Id. at 12.
275. Id.
276. Id. at 13.
277. Id. The Committee did believe that Chamberlain was not “incompetent” as to the
Board’s reappraisements, but believed it impossible to assign him exclusively to those functions. Id. at 14.
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portance” and the Committee believed that “[c]ertain really important opinions” that appeared under Chamberlain’s name were
in fact written by someone else. 278 Finally—and here the Report
takes a darker turn—the Committee critiqued his use of “alcohol”
which had “brought scandal upon the Board.” 279 The Committee
thus recommended his dismissal for “incompetence”—a ground
that nowhere appeared in the statutory standard, but likely falls
most comfortably under “neglect of duty” or “inefficiency.” 280
On March 3, 1913, Taft dismissed both Sharretts and Chamberlain using similar letters. 281 In his removal letters, Taft remarked
that the Committee had “sustained” the charges and “advis[ed]”
their removal “because of malfeasance in office” for Sharretts
and “because of neglect of duty and inefficiency” for Chamberlain. 282 Taft declared that he had “approved” the “finding” and that,
as a result, each was “hereby removed from [his] office.” 283
The very next day—March 4, 1913—Taft left office. 284 Woodrow
Wilson was now the President of the United States. 285
III. AFTERMATH AND IMPLICATIONS
A. Aftermath
In the immediate aftermath of the removals, Sharretts suggested that he would challenge Taft’s actions in court. He justified

278. Id. at 13. As the Committee put it, “after examining [Chamberlain] concerning
[those opinions] . . . [i]t was perfectly evident that he did not and could not have written
them”—and they bore “internal evidence of having been written by another member of the
Board.” Id.
279. Id. at 14 (“On one or two occasions he appears to have been actually intoxicated
while on duty, though it has not often gone to that extent.”).
280. See id. at 13; see also Letter from William Wemple, Assistant Attorney Gen. of the
U.S., U.S. Dep’t of Justice, to Winfred Denison, Assistant Attorney Gen. of the U.S., U.S.
Dep’t of Justice (Feb. 25, 1913), microformed on Taft Papers, reel 361 (bringing to the attention of the Committee Sharretts’s service on panels affecting his son’s cases, and alleging
that the “state of facts” was “so flagrant and so impudent” that the President should “not
leave office without taking action on it”).
281. Letter from William H. Taft, President of the U.S., to Thaddeus S. Sharretts, Office
of the Gen. Appraisers of Merch. (Mar. 3, 1913), microformed on Taft Papers, reel 516; Letter
from William H. Taft, President of the U.S., to Roy Chamberlain, Office of the Gen. Appraisers of Merch. (Mar. 3, 1913), microformed on Taft Papers, reel 516.
282. Id.
283. Id.
284. Appraisers Let Out on Taft’s Last Day, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 4, 1913, at 4.
285. See id.
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his letter to the railroad as a mere request so that he could “be at
[his] desk in New York the first thing Monday mornings,” which
was “in the interest of the Government rather than [himself].” 286
As for the charges that he had decided cases to favor his son’s law
firm, he took them up “in great detail, and justified his rulings as
based on judicial and other precedents, as well as on the intent of
Congress in framing the last three tariff acts.” 287 But he elected not
to bring a legal challenge. 288 It was also suggested that President
Woodrow Wilson might somehow seek to rescind the removals. But
Wilson elected not to pursue that path, later announcing that he
would not revisit the decision despite pressure from some senators. 289
The Democrats did revisit tariff rates during the Wilson presidency, however, because the tariff had played a significant role in
the presidential election of 1912. 290 Immediately upon taking office
President Wilson convened a special session to deal with the matter, and the new Democratic majority in Congress enacted a bill
(“Underwood-Simmons Bill”) in October 1913, thereby accomplishing “the most complete reversal of tariff policy which the United
States had witnessed for half a century.” 291 Just four years after
the enactment of the Payne-Aldrich Bill, the Underwood-Simmons
Bill substantially lowered tariff rates almost across the board. 292
To offset the decrease in customs revenues, the Underwood-Simmons Bill instituted an income tax—the first such tax under the
Sixteenth Amendment, which had been ratified two months earlier. 293 Less than a year after the passage of the Underwood-Simmons Bill, World War I started, which scrambled the United
States’ trade with other countries far more than any tariff could. 294
By the time the war was over, debates over the size and scope of

286. Sharretts to Fight, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 5, 1913, at 11.
287. Tried to Make Train Stop, supra note 252, at 10.
288. See Webb Resolution Tabled, supra note 156, at 13. The author has found no record
that either Sharretts or Chamberlain challenged his removal.
289. Banking, Financial, and Legislative News, 96 COM. & FIN. CHRON. 834, 834–35
(1913); Wilson Upholds Taft, L.A. TIMES, Mar. 12, 1913, at 11; Won’t Help Ex-Appraiser,
WASH. POST, Mar. 12, 1913, at 14.
290. ASHLEY, supra note 95, at 258.
291. Id. at 258–59.
292. KAPLAN & RYLEY, supra note 88, at 49–51.
293. Id. at 51.
294. ASHLEY, supra note 95, at 263–64.
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the federal government’s taxing authority would center on the income tax, leaving the principal rationale for a tariff the same one
that Alexander Hamilton had given over a century earlier—protection of American industry. 295
The significance of this tariff revision was thus short-lived. In
the future, the income tax would be the primary locus of contention
in debates over the size, scope, and powers of the federal government.
The various actors in the drama went in different directions.
William Loeb tendered his resignation as Collector of the Post of
New York to President Wilson and retired to a life in private industry. 296 Felix Frankfurter stayed in Washington, D.C., for a few
months. 297 On June 12, 1913, Winfred Denison wrote to Edward H.
Warren, a friend and professor at Harvard Law School, asking him
whether he was aware of “any reasonable opening in your faculty
for Frankfurter.” 298 After funds were raised to endow a professorship at Harvard Law School, Frankfurter decamped to Cambridge,
where (with brief interludes) he remained until his appointment
as Associate Justice of the Supreme Court in 1939. 299
Taft, by contrast, moved to Yale Law School, where he became
the Kent Professor of Law and wrote a treatise on presidential
power, Our Chief Magistrate and His Powers. 300 When Warren
Harding was elected President, he nominated Taft to be Chief Justice of the United States Supreme Court, where he would go on to
write Myers. 301

295. See DOBSON, supra note 18, at 1 (observing that the “importance of the revenueraising aspect of tariffs has declined markedly in the period since 1913” when the Sixteenth
Amendment to the Constitution was ratified, with customs duties shrinking since that era
from between fifty and ninety percent to one or two percent, of federal income). Wilson vetoed a tariff bill before leaving office in 1921, but Harding signed bills raising rates in both
1921 and 1922. KAPLAN & RYLEY, supra note 88, at 100–02, 119.
296. Loeb Quits as Collector, CHI. DAILY TRIB., Mar. 4, 1913, at 16.
297. HIRSCH, supra note 10, at 39.
298. BAKER, supra note 10, at 41.
299. Id. at 41, 49, 213; see U.S. GOV’T PRINTING OFFICE, 88TH CONG., 1ST SESS., OFFICIAL
CONGRESSIONAL DIRECTORY 615 (1963); HIRSCH, supra note 10, at 38, 40–41; HOLMES AND
FRANKFURTER: THEIR CORRESPONDENCE, 1912–1934, at 14 (Robert M. Mennel & Christine
L. Compston eds., 1996).
300. JOINT COMM. ON PRINTING, 67TH CONG., 3D SESS., OFFICIAL CONGRESSIONAL
DIRECTORY 393 (1922).
301. Id.
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Winfred Denison served for two years in the colonial administration of the Philippines. 302 Tragically, despairing at his ill health,
he later killed himself by jumping in front of a Manhattan subway
train in 1919. 303
B. Implications
Finally, this part considers three overarching implications from
the creation and development of the Board generally and from
Taft’s 1913 dismissal of Sharretts and Chamberlain specifically.
First, the entire history illuminates present-day understandings of
the development of the administrative state. Second, the involvement of Taft and Frankfurter in the events of 1912 and 1913 casts
light on the three major opinions decided by the Supreme Court—
Myers, Humphrey’s Executor, and Wiener—in the first half of the
twentieth century. Third, Taft’s application of the “inefficiency, neglect of duty, or malfeasance in office” standard has bearing for interpreting congressional enactments that contain the same terms.
1. Institutional Design
The creation of the Board of General Appraisers demonstrates
the close connection between the adoption of for-cause removal provisions in the late-nineteenth century with the corresponding attempt to create administrative boards to adjudicate disputes. Like
the Interstate Commerce Act, which was enacted just three years
earlier and created the Interstate Commerce Commission, the Customs Administrative Act provided that the President could remove
members of the Board for “inefficiency, neglect of duty, or malfeasance in office.” 304 The debate surrounding the adoption of this
statute reflected deep constitutional divisions about whether Congress could eliminate preexisting judicial and jury trial rights and
lodge final decision-making authority in an administrative body.

302. See SNYDER, supra note 8, at 77–79 (observing that President Wilson nominated
Denison to be an official in the governing institutions of the Philippines and that his confirmation was controversial because he had created “enemies while investigating the Board of
Appraisers”).
303. Winfred T. Denison Commits Suicide: Former United States Assistant Attorney General Jumps in Front of Subway Train, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 6, 1919, at 16.
304. Customs Administrative Act of 1890, ch. 407, § 12, 26 Stat. 131, 136.
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Both of these constitutional questions—the lawfulness of restrictions on presidential removal and the scope of Congress’s authority to shift disputes from judicial to administrative adjudication—remain hotly debated today. As the history of the Board
demonstrates, these two ideas grew up in tandem. It was only natural for congressional representatives worried about the elimination of Article III lawsuits to live with the accommodation provided
by good-cause removal restrictions.
The post-1913 development of the Board demonstrates the close
connection even more starkly. Treasury Secretary MacVeagh
transmitted the Committee’s Report to the incoming Wilson Administration, recommending “[r]adical changes in the structure of
the Board.” 305 In 1926—the same year that the Court was to decide
Myers, Congress changed the name of the Board of General Appraisers to the United States Customs Court. 306 Three decades
later, in 1956, Congress vested the court with Article III status by
formally giving its members the tenure and salary protections required by Article III. 307 In 1980, Congress retained the Court’s Article III status and renamed it the United States Court of International Trade, which is the form and title that it retains. 308 As a
consequence, the Board was one of the few non-Article III adjudicatory tribunals within the executive branch to transition fully to
Article III status, where it remains today.
2. Myers, Humphrey’s Executor, and Wiener
It is a fascinating coincidence that Taft and Frankfurter—two
towering figures in twentieth-century American legal history—
played such a pivotal role in the removal of Sharretts and Chamberlain. After all, as Supreme Court Justices, they would go on to
author two of the pivotal early twentieth-century opinions on the
President’s removal power. Taft wrote the 1926 opinion in Myers,
while Frankfurter wrote the 1958 opinion in Wiener. 309 In between

305. Changes Urged in the Form of U.S. Appraisers Board, WALL STREET. J., Mar. 14,
1913.
306. Act of May 28, 1926, ch. 411, § 1, 44 Stat. 669, 669; see also Ex parte Bakelite Corp.,
279 U.S. 438, 457–58 (1929) (commenting on the constitutional status of the Customs
Court).
307. Act of July 14, 1956, Pub. L. No. 84-703, 70 Stat. 532.
308. Act of Oct. 10, 1980, Pub. L. No. 96-417, 94 Stat. 1727; see FALLON, JR. ET AL., supra
note 24, at 34.
309. Wiener v. United States, 357 U.S. 349, 349 (1958); Myers v. United States, 272 U.S.
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these two cases, Justice George Sutherland wrote the Court’s opinion in Humphrey’s Executor. 310 None of the three opinions expressly mentions the events of 1912 and 1913. But thanks to the
Court’s early encounter with the Board in Shurtleff, all three cases
confronted the constitutionality of the Board’s administrative
structure.
Consider Myers. Commentators have often remarked that Chief
Justice Taft, the author of the Court’s Myers opinion, had previously served as President. Indeed, Justice Frankfurter—writing
for the Court in Wiener—made the point, noting that the Court in
Myers had spoken “through a Chief Justice who himself had been
President.” 311 In Myers, Taft observed that, under Shurtleff, provisions stating that the President may remove an officer for “inefficiency, neglect of duty, or malfeasance in office” such as the one
Congress initially enacted in the Customs Administrative Act did
not limit the President’s removal authority. According to Myers:
Since the provision for an Interstate Commerce Commission, in 1887,
many administrative boards have been created whose members are
appointed by the President, by and with the advice and consent of the
Senate, and in the statutes creating them have been provisions for the
removal of the members for specified causes. Such provisions are
claimed to be inconsistent with the independent power of removal by
the President. This, however, is shown to be unfounded by the case of
Shurtleff v. United States, 189 U.S. 311 (1903). 312

In dissent, Justice Brandeis agreed. He observed that, under
Shurtleff, provisions simply authorizing removal for “inefficiency,
neglect of duty, or malfeasance in office” did not restrict “the President’s power to remove for other than the causes specified.” 313
Through Shurtleff, the Board provided a backdrop against which
the Court understood the removal restriction at issue in Myers. It
also forced both Chief Justice Taft and Justice Brandeis to confront
the constitutionality of good-cause restrictions, even though the
kind of restriction at issue in Myers required the Senate’s advice
and consent before presidential removal.

52, 106 (1926).
310. Humphrey’s Ex’r v. United States, 295 U.S. 602, 618 (1935).
311. Wiener, 357 U.S. at 351.
312. Myers, 272 U.S. at 171.
313. Id. at 262 n.30 (Brandeis, J., dissenting); see id. at 177 (Holmes, J., dissenting); id.
at 181 (McReynolds, J., dissenting).
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In Humphrey’s Executor, Justice Sutherland spent a significant
portion of the opinion distinguishing Shurtleff’s holding. Unlike
the provision governing the Board that Taft and Frankfurter confronted in 1912 and 1913—after Congress had amended the Customs Administrative Act by the 1908 Act to make the three statutory removal bases exclusive—the removal provision governing the
FTC was identical to the removal provision considered by the Court
in Shurtleff. 314 Indeed, in its brief to the Court in Humphrey’s Executor, the United States government expressly relied on the
Court’s construction in Shurtleff of the “inefficiency, neglect of
duty, or malfeasance in office” language and relied on Congress’s
subsequent change to the language in the 1908 Act. 315 The government pointed out that—following Shurtleff—Congress in the 1908
Act “amended the Customs Administrative Act to provide expressly that a removal could be made for one of the stated causes
and for no other.” 316 And the government relied on the timeline—
the decision in Shurtleff in 1903, Congress’s amendment to the removal restriction for the Board in 1908, and Congress’s use of the
same language at stake in Shurtleff in the Federal Trade Commission Act in 1914—in an attempt to demonstrate that Congress did
not intend to limit the President’s authority to remove commissioners to the three listed causes. 317
Based on this timeline, the government contended that “Congress was aware of the construction given to the [Customs Administrative] Act by this Court” in Shurtleff in 1903, when it amended
the Act in 1908, and when it created the FTC in 1914. 318 The government contended that the reasoning of Shurtleff was understood
to be applicable to the FTC by the majority and dissenting opinions
in Myers, notwithstanding that the members of the Board were
subject to no term and the commissioners were subject to a seven-

314. See Humphrey’s Ex’r, 295 U.S. at 621–23.
315. Brief for the United States at 6, Humphrey’s Ex’r, 295 U.S. 602 (No. 667).
316. Id.
317. See id. at 11–12.
318. Id. at 13. The government listed a series of statutes that, like the 1908 Act, restricted the President’s removal power to the three specified causes “and no others.” See id.
at 6, 13; see also Act of June 21, 1934, ch. 691, sec. 4, § 4, 48 Stat. 1185, 1193–94 (National
Mediation Board); Act of May 20, 1926, ch. 347, § 4, 44 Stat. 577, 579 (Board of Mediation);
Act of June 2, 1924, ch. 234, § 900(a), (b), 43 Stat. 253, 336 (Board of Tax Appeals); Act of
Mar. 4, 1923, ch. 248, § 1, 42 Stat. 1446, 1446 (United States Coal Commission); Act of Feb.
28, 1920, ch. 91, §§ 304, 306(b), 41 Stat. 456, 470 (Railroad Labor Board); Act of July 15,
1913, ch, 6, § 11, 38 Stat. 103, 108 (creating a Commissioner of Mediation and Conciliation).
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year term. 319 And the government contended that the FTC and the
Board were “strikingly similar in the relevant essentials of organization and functions,” in that the Board was established to be a
“disinterested tribunal to pass upon” controversies arising out of
contested appraisals. 320
It was to no avail—perhaps surprisingly, given that Sutherland
was present for the legislative debates in the Senate in both 1908
and 1914. Sutherland’s opinion for the Court in Humphrey’s Executor made no mention of Congress’s amendments to the removal
provision governing the Board.
Finally, in Wiener, Justice Frankfurter’s opinion for the Court
pivoted almost 180 degrees from Chief Justice Taft’s opinion for
the Court in Myers—inferring, as a matter of congressional intent,
that quasi-judicial officers are presumptively removable only for
cause even when a statute fails to include an express for-cause removal provision. 321 As the government argued in the case, that result was wholly inconsistent with Shurtleff, which required clear
statutory language for Congress to limit the President’s power to
remove “judges” comprising administrative bodies like the
Board. 322 Frankfurter’s opinion ignored Shurtleff, a case that was
the backdrop against which the removals of 1913 occurred. 323
Understanding why is no easy task. Above all, Wiener displays
a confidence that the Court can easily distinguish between “executive” officers and “quasi-judicial” officers, thus allowing it (rather
than Congress) to be the final arbiter on whether a particular statutory scheme limits presidential removal. Since Wiener, the tide
has receded, with cases like Morrison v. Olson all but abandoning
the project of distinguishing between “executive” and “quasi-judicial” officers. Statutory text, as a result, plays more of a role in
determining the President’s removal authority than Wiener suggests.

319.
320.
321.
322.
323.

Brief for the United States at 14–15, Humphrey’s Ex’r, 295 U.S. 602 (No. 667).
Id. at 17.
Wiener v. United States, 357 U.S. 349, 352, 356 (1958).
Brief for the United States at 31–32, Wiener, 357 U.S. 349 (No. 52).
See generally Wiener, 357 U.S. 349 (containing no discussion of Shurtleff).
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3. “Inefficiency, Neglect of Duty, or Malfeasance in Office”
Finally, Taft’s firing of Sharretts and Chamberlain casts light on
the meaning of the terms “inefficiency, neglect of duty, or malfeasance in office.” To this day, Congress frequently uses that language in an attempt to create agency “independence” from presidential control, despite its unsettled meaning. Taft’s (and
Frankfurter’s) interpretation of the relevant language has implications for the present-day understanding of those statutory terms.
First, as to process: Taft’s actions in 1913 appear to establish a
precedent demonstrating the procedures for notice and a hearing
that would meet any requirements that might be understood to be
imposed by constitutional or statutory law. Specifically, Taft’s use
of a committee to provide process to Sharretts and Chamberlain
indicates that the kind of hearing that might be required (assuming that one is) before an officer removal is not a personal hearing
before the President. 324
Second, as to the substance of the statutory standards: the Taft
precedent of 1912 and 1913 provides a unique executive branch
gloss on the terms “inefficiency, neglect of duty, or malfeasance in
office.” Consider, for example, the recent opinions in the D.C. Circuit case of PHH Corp. v. Consumer Financial Protection Bureau.
An extensive concurring opinion in that case by Judge Thomas
Griffith starts with a “fundamental question: How difficult is it for
the President to remove the Director?” 325 The opinion canvassed
sources that might provide evidence of the meaning of the statute
protecting the Director of the Consumer Financial Protection Bureau from removal by the President—which includes the identical
“inefficiency, neglect of duty, or malfeasance in office” language in
the Board of General Appraisers statute. 326 To interpret that language, Judge Griffith’s opinion focused on dictionary definitions of
the statutory terms, state-law cases, and legislative debates to understand these terms. 327 But neither Judge Griffith’s opinion, nor,
for that matter, any of the academic commentary, has focused on

324. PHH Corp. v. Consumer Fin. Prot. Bureau, 881 F.3d 75, 135 (D.C. Cir. 2018) (en
banc) (Griffith, J., concurring) (“Although the Supreme Court has not defined the precise
contours of this process, there is little reason to think it would impose an onerous burden
on the President.”).
325. Id. at 124.
326. Id. at 130–34.
327. Id. at 131–32 & nn.10–12, 133.
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the meaning that executive branch practice has given the “inefficiency, neglect of duty, or malfeasance in office” language. 328
That lacuna is significant because it is well-established that executive branch practice informs the meaning of legal text implicating the separation of powers. 329 Taft’s removal of Sharretts and
Chamberlain thus provides a crucial data point on this statutory
question, given the rarity with which presidents have removed officers “for cause.” Indeed, after the Court’s opinion in Humphrey’s
Executor, only one President has done so. In 1969, President Richard Nixon fired Raymond Lapin from his post as President of the
Federal National Mortgage Association—otherwise known as
“Fannie Mae.” 330 At the time, the President of the United States
could remove the President of Fannie Mae only for “good cause.” 331
Without conducting a hearing, Nixon sent Lapin a letter saying:

328. A small body of academic literature addresses the meaning of these terms. See, e.g.,
Lawrence Lessig & Cass R. Sunstein, The President and the Administration, 94 COLUM. L.
REV. 1, 110–12 (1994) (“Purely as a textual matter . . . ‘inefficiency, neglect of duty, or malfeasance in office’ seem best read to grant the President at least something in the way of
supervisory and removal power—allowing him, for example, to discharge, as inefficient or
neglectful of duty, those commissioners who show lack of diligence, ignorance, incompetence, or lack of commitment to their legal duties . . . . [or to] discharge commissioners who
have frequently or on important occasions acted in ways inconsistent with the President’s
wishes with respect to what is required by sound policy.”); John F. Manning, The Independent Counsel Statute: Reading “Good Cause” in Light of Article II, 83 MINN. L. REV. 1285,
1288 (1999) (contending that the “good cause” removal provision in the independent-counsel
statute should be read to permit removal for insubordination to avoid a “serious constitutional question”); Geoffrey P. Miller, Independent Agencies, 1986 SUP. CT. REV. 41, 86–87
(arguing for a broad interpretation of for-cause removal provisions); Richard H. Pildes &
Cass R. Sunstein, Reinventing the Regulatory State, 62 U. CHI. L. REV. 1, 30 (1995) (understanding the terms “inefficiency” and “neglect of duty” to permit removal where an officer is
“incompetent [due to] consistently foolish policy choices”); Lindsay Rogers, The Independent
Regulatory Commissions, 52 POL. SCI. Q. 1, 7–8 (1937) (predicting “[n]o ‘institutional consequences’ . . . from the Humphrey case” because the statutory standard imposes a low burden
on Presidents); Paul R. Verkuil, The Status of Independent Agencies After Bowsher v. Synar,
1986 DUKE L.J. 779, 797 n.100 (noting that the removal standard “could be construed so as
to encompass a general charge of maladministration, in which event even if the terms of
removal are deemed to be exclusive they could still be satisfied by a removal by the President
on the ground of policy incompatibility”).
329. NLRB v. Noel Canning, 573 U.S. __, __, 134 S. Ct. 2550, 2559 (2014) (placing “significant weight upon historical practice” in interpreting constitutional provisions that “concern the allocation of power between two elected branches of Government”); Youngstown
Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579, 610 (1952) (Frankfurter, J., concurring) (“Deeply
embedded traditional ways of conducting government cannot supplant the Constitution or
legislation, but they give meaning to the words of a text or supply them.”); see also Aditya
Bamzai, The Origins of Judicial Deference to Executive Interpretation, 126 YALE L.J. 908,
912 (2017).
330. See BREGER & EDLES, supra note 9, at 155 (recounting this episode).
331. Housing and Urban Development Act of 1968, Pub. L. No. 90-448, § 810(b)(2), 82
Stat. 476, 546 (1968).
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“You are hereby removed for good cause.” 332 Nixon’s letter informed Lapin that he was being removed because his “policies and
practices” were “inconsistent with the objectives of applicable law
and with the standards expected of officials holding positions of
trust and confidence under the laws of the United States.” 333 But
it provided no further elaboration. Lapin denounced Nixon’s action
as “illegal” and initiated, but then dropped, a legal challenge to his
removal. 334
During the events of 1912 and 1913, by contrast, the Committee
did specify the reasons for the removals. In this regard, it is telling
that the Committee appeared to convict Sharretts on suspicion
that he used his “official power to compel personal favors” in the
form of getting a train to stop at a convenient location and that he
had set “precedents for favorable decisions of his son’s cases.” 335
Those charges of self-dealing certainly appear serious, but the
Committee’s judgment on this issue is important not only because
of the standard it imposed, but also because of the Committee’s
implicit assumption that it was qualified to weigh and to judge the
conflicting evidence. Specifically, with respect to the second
charge, the Report conceded that the evidence against Sharretts
was “circumstantial.” 336 In this regard, the Committee acknowledged that Sharretts could bring forth some evidence to support
his position. But the Report suggests that, while evidence must exist to meet the statutory standards, countervailing evidence may
also exist, allowing the executive finder of fact to weigh the facts.

332. Murray Seeger, Nixon Fires Housing Mortgage Chief but He Refuses to Go, L.A.
TIMES, Dec. 3, 1969, at 1.
333. Id. at 24.
334. Id.; Lapin Drops Action Over FNMA Post, WASH. POST TIMES HERALD, Feb. 17,
1970, at D12. According to news reports, George Romney, the Secretary of Housing, had
advised the President that the relationship between his department and Fannie Mae had
“ceased” and could be restored solely by Lapin’s removal. See Seeger, supra note 332, at 1,
24. Fannie Mae’s board of directors had unanimously recommended Lapin’s removal. See
id. at 24; see also JAMES R. HAGERTY, THE FATEFUL HISTORY OF FANNIE MAE: NEW DEAL
BIRTH TO MORTGAGE CRISIS FALL 43–46 (2012); Robert B. Semple, Jr., Nixon Dismisses
Mortgage Chief; Fight Is Planned, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 2, 1969, at 1 (observing that Nixon’s
letter did not elaborate on what he meant by “good cause” or on the charges against Lapin).
335. REPORT, supra note 250, at 4, 6.
336. Id. at 9.
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With respect to Chamberlain, the charge was “incompetence,”
because he lacked the “qualifications for the performance of his duties” or the “natural aptitude” for the Board’s work. 337 In this respect, the Committee’s Report suggests that a President can meet
the removal standard when an officer, by some metric, is simply
not good at his job.
To be sure, Taft’s for-cause removal of the general appraisers is
only one historical data point among many that may collectively be
assembled to establish the meaning, in context, of the statutes that
create the “independent” agencies. In an area where executive
branch practice is given significant weight, however, it is a crucial,
singular data point that ought to inform executive branch and judicial understanding of the “inefficiency, neglect of duty, or malfeasance in office” standard in the future.
CONCLUSION
This article has explored a fascinating moment in the history of
the American presidency: William Howard Taft’s for-cause removal of two members of the Board of General Appraisers on the
very last day that he was in office. Now obscure, the Board once
wielded significant authority during an era when tariffs were the
major source of revenue for the federal government. The development of the Board provided significant precedents—the Supreme
Court’s decision in Shurtleff and President Taft’s decision to dismiss Sharretts and Chamberlain—for the President’s removal
power. The decision makers during the events of 1912 and 1913—
William Howard Taft and a young Felix Frankfurter—went on to
become Supreme Court Justices and to write two of the most important precedents on the President’s authority to remove subordinates, Myers and Wiener. Finally, Taft’s actions and the record
from the events of 1912 and 1913 cast important light on the statutory language “inefficiency, neglect of duty, or malfeasance in office,” which Congress still uses to mark some kind of agency “independence” from presidential control.

337.

Id. at 13.

